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USING AN "INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
WHEN CONSIDERING INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX COUPLES' MARRIAGES, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
Barbara J. Cox*
I. AN(OTHER PERSONAL) INTRODUCTION
ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1
My spouse, Peg Habetler, and I were married last summer,
after almost thirteen years in a committed relationship. I still
struggle to use the word "spouse" after referring to her as "partner"
for so many years. Our local paper ran an article about us getting
married last summer.2 As the article noted, "I proposed in
December of 1991. And in July of 2003 we're finally getting
married. It was a very long engagement." 3 Like many U.S. couples,
we went to Ontario, Canada, shortly after the Court of Appeal for
Ontario, that province's highest court, held that the exclusion of
same-sex couples from the institution of civil marriage violated
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; J.D. University of
Wisconsin, 1982; B.A. Michigan State University, 1978. I would like to thank
my family and friends for all their support for our wedding in July 2003 in
Canada. I would also like to thank Bobbi Weaver, reference librarian at
California Western, for her extensive assistance in obtaining non-US materials
for this article, as well as CWSL's other reference librarians who assisted me,
and Steven Jodlowski (J.D. 2004) for his research assistance. I would also like to
thank my spouse, Peg Habelter, for her continuing support and inspiration.
1 See also Barbara J. Cox, A (Personal) Essay on Same-Sex Marriage, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 27-29 (Robert M.
Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
2 Nina Garin, The Biggest Challenge of Their Marriage May Be the State
Government, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 2003, at E2.
3 Id. Actually, we had a commitment ceremony in April 1992, so our
"wedding" came only five months after my proposal. Although that ceremony
had all the significance of a wedding for us, our friends, and our families, like all
same-sex relationships in the United States at that time, it provided no legal
recognition, benefits, or responsibilities.
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Canada's federal Constitution-the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.4
My work seeking legal recognition of and protection for same-
sex couples' relationships began in 1983 when I chaired a task
force of the Madison, Wisconsin Equal Opportunities Commission
that was studying whether to provide rights and legal recognition
to people in "alternative family" relationships. As detailed in two
earlier articles, 5 we were among a handful of cities at the time
considering how to provide rights and recognition to these
relationships. Now known as domestic partnerships, in the twenty
years since those early efforts, significant changes have occurred.
Marriage by same-sex couples is now permitted in the Netherlands,
Belgium, 6 and Canada,7 and has just been won in Massachusetts.
8
4 Halpern v. Att'y Gen. of Canada, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 199-200.
5 See Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family
Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-5 (1986) [hereinafter Cox, Alternative Families]; Barbara J.
Cox, Choosing One s Family: Can the Legal System Address the Breadth of
Women's Choice of Intimate Relationship?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 299,
308-22 (1989).
6 See Developments in the Law (pt. 2), Inching Down the Aisle: Differing
Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and
Europe, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2004 (2003) (citing the marriage laws of the
Netherlands and Belgium) [hereinafter Inching Down the Aisle]. This
Developments in the Law series starts with an introduction at Developments in
the Law-: The Law of Marriage and Family: I. Introduction, Nuclear
Nonproliferation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1996 (2003); see also Nancy G. Maxwell,
Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United States
Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 141 (2001).
7 Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 199-200; EGALE Canada Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of
Canada, [2003] 15 B.C.L.R.4th 226 (amending 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1, which had
found the limitation of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples to be
unconstitutional, but postponed the effective date of its decision to July 2004).
Both of these courts declared same-sex couples could marry immediately. The
Canadian federal government declined to appeal the Halpern decision, and
instead, asked the Supreme Court to respond to the "Reference" of questions on
whether the government's draft bill defining marriage as the "lawful union of
two persons to the exclusion of all others" was consistent with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Nicholas Bala, Controversy over Couples
in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent
Relationships, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 41, 77-79 (2003). The Government has since
asked the Court whether the traditional definition of marriage as between a man
and a woman is consistent with the Charter. This change will set back the date of
700 [Vol. 13
"INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
In these locations, any two people who are otherwise permitted to
marry9 may do so with exactly the same rights and responsibilities
as all other couples.
In many European countries, including Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and
apparently soon in Britain, same-sex couples are permitted to enter
into some type of "registered partnership" whereby most, but not
all, of the rights of marriage are provided to those couples.' 0 In
four states-Vermont, Hawaii, California, and New Jersey-same-
arguments, originally set for April 16, 2004, to sometime in the fall of 2004 with
a decision expected in the middle of 2005. See Jim Brown, Same-Sex Marriage
Referral Broadened, LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 29, 2004, at A4.
8Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-09163, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.
Feb. 3, 2004). Here the court answered the request from the Massachusetts
Senate, in Senate Bill No. 2176, for an advisory opinion on whether Senate Bill
No. 2175, which would prevent same-sex couples from marrying but would
permit them to enter into civil unions with all the benefits, protections, rights,
and responsibilities of married couples, was constitutional, given the court's
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003). The court said that "[t]he answer to the question is 'No."' Id. at 18,
detailed below infra notes 24-30. For copies of the briefs submitted on behalf of
the plaintiffs, see Amicus Briefs Responding to Massachusetts Senate Request
for SJC Advisory Opinion (filed Jan. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.glad.org/marriage/advisoryopinion-amici.shtml (last visited March
26, 2004).
9 Some restrictions remain, such as both individuals being of age (as
defined by that jurisdiction), not within certain family relationships, and
mentally competent to enter into a marriage.
10 Inching Down the Aisle, supra note 6, at 2004, 2007-08; see also
Cynthia J. Sgalla McClure, Note, A Case for Same-Sex Marriage: A Look at
Changes Around the Globe and in the United States, Including Baker v.
Vermont, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 783, 803-806 (2002) (citing laws in numerous
European countries); Greg Taylor, Forum: Same-Sex Unions and the Law: The
New Gay and Lesbian Partnerships Law in Germany, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 573
(2003). The United Kingdom, including England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland, is discussing a Civil Partnerships Bill, which would provide numerous
rights to same-sex couples. See Melanie Bien, No Ring, No Rights: Cohabitating
Couples Left Out in the Cold, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, Nov. 30, 2003, at 14.
Additionally, same-sex unions have been recognized for limited rights in
Hungary, Portugal, and France. Inching Down the Aisle, supra note 6, at 2008
n.29. For a discussion of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the
U.S. and Europe, see YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES (2002).
2004]
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sex couples who form "civil unions," "reciprocal beneficiaries
relationships," or "domestic partnerships," respectively, are given
most, but not all, of the state rights and responsibilities of
marriage.1' Countless cities, municipalities, and counties also offer
some domestic partner rights, and thousands of U.S. companies
offer domestic partner benefits, including family-based health
insurance, to same-sex couples.1
2
As Congress holds hearings and ponders whether to add an
amendment, which discriminates against the marriages of same-sex
couples, to the United States Constitution, 13 my spouse and I found
ourselves surprised by the significant change we felt from getting
'1 Vermont civil unions receive all the state-based rights and
responsibilities provided to married couples, except the name, under VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002). Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary relationships
receive limited benefits. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (Michie 1999). California
domestic partnerships will receive many of the state-based rights and
responsibilities provided to married couples, except for tax benefits, once the
law takes effect on January 1, 2005. See California Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003, 2003 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 421 (Deering). New
Jersey domestic partnerships will provide many of the rights that are provided to
married couples. See Domestic Partnership Act, 2003 N.J. Laws 246. The
Governor signed the bill into law on January 12, 2004. See Ruth Padawer,
Rights for Same-Sex Couples Become Law, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.),
Jan. 13, 2004, at A03. Both the California and New Jersey laws explicitly
recognize legal relationships of same-sex couples from other states. See 2003
N.J. Laws 246, § 6c; 2003 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 421, § 9 (creating CAL. FAM.
CODE § 299.2). None of these couples receive federal benefits due to the
discrimination written into federal statutes by the so-called "Defense of
Marriage Act," 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
12 See Barbara J. Cox, "The Little Project" From Alternative Families to
Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Marriage, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 79
(2000) [hereinafter "The Little Project'].
'3 H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003), introduced on May 21, 2003, states
the following:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution In]or the constitution of any State, nor state
or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred on unmarried couples or groups.
Id. Alternative proposals eliminating the statutory references have also been
proposed. The Constitutional Amendment to ban gay marriage failed in the
United States Senate on July 15, 2004, by a vote of 48-50. Same-Sex Marriage
Senate Battle Over, War is Not: GOP Leaders Fail to get Enough Votes to
Advance Measure, (July 15, 2004), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2004ALLPOLITICS/07/14/samesex.marriage (last visisted July 26, 2004).
"INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
married. We have both spent the past several months struggling
with how to describe the difference it made for us.
We have considered ourselves married since April 1992, and
our friends and family have treated us that way. After eighteen
months in a long-distance relationship between Madison,
Wisconsin, and San Diego, California, we had a commitment
ceremony to celebrate the love and support that we had found in
our relationship. Before many other gay and lesbian couples were
making public commitments to one another, we decided we wanted
to ask our friends and families to join us in celebrating a
relationship that we were prepared to commit to for our lifetimes.
We had two celebrations, one in Madison and one in San Diego,
and over one hundred people attended each. In this support, we
have been blessed unlike many same-sex couples whose families
or friends turn away from them as they take steps to express the
commitment and love they have found in their most significant
relationship. 14
So when we called our family members last summer and told
them that we were going to get married in Canada, many expressed
confusion. They asked, "Why do you want to get civilly married
when you're already married?" and "If your Canadian marriage
may not be honored in the U.S., why take that additional step?" As
we struggled to explain to them what we struggled to know for
ourselves, we experienced firsthand the complex, often
contradictory, emotions that connect the institution of marriage to
members of this society.
Perhaps we should have simply read to them from the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision in Halpern v. Attorney General of-
Canada.
Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most significant forms
of personal relationships .... Through the institution of
marriage, individuals can publicly express their love and
commitment to each other. Through this institution, society
publicly recognizes expressions of love and commitment
14 They turn away when most opposite-sex couples are embraced by their
friends and families during a time filled with bridal showers, bachelor parties,
wedding registries, developing relationships between the spouses' families, and
feelings of excitement, hope, and happiness for the new couple.
2004]
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between individuals, granting them respect and legitimacy as a
couple. This public recognition and sanction of marital
relationships reflect society's approbation of the personal
hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed
conjugal relationships. This can only enhance an individual's
sense of self-worth and dignity.
15
Even while we struggled to explain why we were taking this
additional step of getting legally married in another country, we
continued to receive support from our friends and families. Our
friends threw us a bridal shower (complete with gag-gifts and
matching "Bride" baseball caps). My parents, Jean and Lyn Cox,
loaned us their car to drive from Kentucky to Windsor, Canada,
and Peg's brother, Bob Habetler, and his daughter, Kristen
Habetler, stood up for us as witnesses while we "eloped" to the
City Hall and the Metropolitan Community Church there.
While planning the wedding, we encountered many of the
differences that exist between having a "private" commitment
ceremony and having a "public" wedding. One was the legal
trappings to which we never had access before. Like all other soon-
to-be married couples, we went to the City Clerk's office at the
Windsor City Hall, and submitted our "marriage application" and
paid the required fee. Like all other soon-to-be married couples, we
swore an oath that the information in our application was true and
were given a "marriage license." Like all other soon-to-be married
couples, we took the license with us to meet with the minister,
Reverend Brenda Hunt of the Metropolitan Community Church of
Windsor, and were married in the chapel that same morning.
Unlike most other couples, we had already had a ceremony
and celebration with our friends and family slightly more than
eleven years earlier. When we got "committed" in 1992, we were
claiming a status for ourselves and our relationship that we thought
might be the only one we would ever be permitted to claim. We
could barely imagine a time in our lifetimes when we could marry
just as our heterosexual parents, siblings, and friends could marry.
Following our wedding in Windsor, we were given the official
"Record of Solemnization of Marriage," something we also never
15 Halpern v. Att'y Gen. of Canada, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 167-68.
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believed would be ours. This governmental sanction of our
relationship was another significant difference between our
commitment ceremony and our wedding. Reverend Hunt ended the
ceremony with the following words, "By the authority given by our
government to solemnize matrimony and the relationship we share
as members of the same family, I declare that you who were two
families are now one family, joined in matrimony and blessed by
the Spirit of Love." Although registered as domestic partners in
both Madison, Wisconsin, and in California, and with my
employer, California Western School of Law, 16 our relationship
had never received the full force and acceptance of a nation's
government. Were we living in Canada, our marriage would be
treated the same as any other couple's marriage.
Perhaps what had the most meaning for us is that we now
share a relationship with countless other couples who also decided
they wanted to share their lives together. The word "marriage" has
such a significant force in our society. We all know what it means
to be married, and we all recognize a couple who is married as one
that has made a long-term commitment to each other, to share the
good and bad in their lives, to join together as a couple, and to seek
support and love from each other. As we keep talking about our
16 Peg and I have often joked that we were going to continue collecting
partnership certificates until one day they provide real rights, benefits, and
responsibilities. The Madison, Wisconsin, domestic partnership permitted us to
live together in areas zoned for single families and to visit each other in the
hospital or in jail (luckily, we needed neither visitation right). The domestic
partnership registry with my employer provides both of us health insurance
benefits. The California domestic partnership gives us rights of hospital
visitation, medical and financial decision making, disability benefits; the right to
sue for wrongful death or emotional distress; the use of form wills and automatic
appointment as administrator; the use of stepparent adoption process;
unemployment insurance benefits; the use of sick leave to care for domestic
partners and their children; rights to health insurance; limited tax benefits; the
right to inherit through intestacy; the right to take paid employment leave to care
for a seriously-ill domestic partner or child; the right to live in senior citizen
developments and to stay upon the other partner's death; and the right to obtain
birth or death records for their partner. As indicated by 2003 Cal. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 421, we will soon receive other significant rights, responsibilities, and
benefits. See supra note 11. It may take some time to find out what rights our
Canadian marriage gives us.
2004]
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"new" relationship, we continue to be amazed by the power of the
word and the deep feelings we have about being "married."
II. SAME-SEX COUPLES WIN THE FREEDOM TO MARRY
IN THE UNITED STATES
Six months to the day after we married in Canada, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 7 became the fourth U.S. court to
declare that denying its same-sex citizens the freedom to marry
violated its state constitution. 18 In language that described the
differences my spouse and I have been feeling after having a
commitment ceremony, registering as domestic partners, and
getting married, Chief Justice Marshall eloquently summarized
why same-sex couples must be permitted by the State to marry:
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and
"7 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
'8 Courts in Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont have also held that excluding
same-sex couples from the right to marry violated their state constitutions.
Inching Down the Aisle, supra note 6, at 2005 n.1 1 (citing Brause v. Bureau of
Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 Cl, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reh'g granted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), remanded to Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996
WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), af'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). However, constitutional amendments
mooted the decisions in Hawaii and Alaska. See Inching Down the Aisle, supra
note 6, at 2005 n.12 (citing ALASKA CONST. art I, § 25 (adopted 1998); HAW.
CONST. art. I § 23 (adopted 1998)). For a discussion of Baehr, see Barbara J.
Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033. (1995)
[hereinafter If We Marry]. The Vermont legislature adopted its civil unions bills
after the Baker court indicated that it could create "some equivalent statutory
alternative" to avoid "disruptive and unforseen consequences." Baker, 744 A.2d
at 867, 887. The Vermont legislature established the institution of "civil unions"
in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002), which states that parties to a civil
union "shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under
law ... as are granted to spouses in a marriage." For a discussion of this case,
see Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont s Civil Unions
Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113
(2000) [hereinafter But Why Not Marriage].
[Vol. 13706
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mutual support; it brings stability to our society .... The
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of
all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive
union with another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of
membership in one of our community's most rewarding and
cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and
equality under law.
Following the lead of the Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Canada, the supreme judicial court redefined the common law
meaning of marriage and said, "We construe civil marriage to
mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others. ',20 The court declared that "barring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the
same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution."2 1 The court
remanded the case to the superior court for entry of a judgment
consistent with the opinion, but stayed entry of that judgment for
180 days "to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may
deem appropriate in light of this opinion."
22
Interestingly, much of the furor in Massachusetts has been
over whether the court, by focusing on the "protections, benefits,
and obligations" 23 of marriage and by staying entry of its
judgment, would permit the legislature to create "some equivalent
statutory alternative" to marriage, similar to Vermont's civil
unions. On December 11, 2003, the Massachusetts Senate voted to
ask the court whether it would satisfy the state constitution for the
legislature to adopt Senate Bill No. 2175, a civil unions bill that
provides all the "benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities of
19 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49 (Mass.
2003).
20 Id. at 969.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 970.
23 Id. at 949.
2004] 707
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marriage, but which also limits marriage to unions between a man
and a woman, rather than extending marriage rights to same-sex
couples.
24
On February 3, 2004, the justices responded to the Senate's
question.25 Writing for the majority, Justice Robert J. Cordy quoted
26parts of the court's opinion in Goodridge, and then explained
why providing same-sex couples with all the benefits and
responsibilities of marriage, while still segregating them from
marriage as was proposed in the civil unions bill, would not be
constitutional.
The constitutional difficulty of the proposed civil union bill is
evident in its stated purpose to 'preserve the traditional, historic
nature and meaning of the institution of civil marriage.' ... Yet
the bill, as we read it, does nothing to 'preserve' the civil
marriage law, only its constitutional infirmity .... The very
nature and purpose of civil marriage, the court concluded,
renders unconstitutional any attempt to ban all same-sex
couples, as same-sex couples, from entering into civil
marriage.
2 7
Focusing on same-sex couples' exclusion from marriage under
the proposed bill, Justice Cordy emphasized that
24 Raphael Lewis, Delay Eyed on Marriage Amendment, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al. For an explanation and history of the advisory
opinion process, see Amicus Curiae Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law
and American Legal History, Request for Advisory Opinion A-107 (Mass. 2004)
(No. SJC-09163), available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/advisoryopinion_
amici.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
25 Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-09163, 802 N.E.2d 565
(Mass. Feb. 3, 2004).
26 "Because it fulfils [sic] yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life's
momentous acts of self-definition." Id. at 567 (citing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
941, 955 (Mass. 2003)). "The court stated that the denial of civil marital status
'works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community
for no rational reason."' Id. (citing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968).
27 802 N.E.2d at 569.
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[b]ecause the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-
sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate
same-sex couples to a different status. The holding in
Goodridge ... is that group classifications based on
unsupportable distinctions ... are invalid under the
Massachusetts Constitution. The history of our nation has
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.2 8
Recognizing that the difference between civil unions and civil
marriage was neither just ""semantic"" nor ""innocuous,, 29 the
justices concluded:
[I]t is a considered choice of language that reflects a
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual,
couples to second-class status .... For no rational reason the
marriage laws of the Commonwealth discriminate against a
defined class; no amount of tinkering with language will
eradicate that stain. The bill would have the effect of
maintaining and fostering a stigma of exclusion that the
Constitution prohibits.
30
28 Id. (emphasis added). See also But Why Not Marriage, supra note 18, at
123-36, which discusses our nation's earlier attempts to create "separate but
equal" institutions in both the race and sex contexts, and how both were
ultimately rejected as unconstitutional. The justices' opinion clearly explains
why similar attempts to do so in the sexual orientation context are equally
unconstitutional.
29 802 N.E.2d at 570. The majority justices specifically reject that portion
of Justice Sosman's separate opinion which, quoting Shakespeare, argues that
the distinction between civil unions and civil marriages is not of constitutional
significance. Id. at n.4. "If... the proponents of the bill believe that no message
is conveyed by eschewing the word 'marriage' and replacing it with 'civil
union' for same-sex 'spouses,' we doubt that the attempt to circumvent the
court's decision in Goodridge would be so purposeful." Id. at 570.30 id.
2004]
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III. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF CIVIL UNIONS BY
SAME-SEX COUPLES
3 1
Now that Massachusetts will join the Netherlands, Belgium,
and two provinces in Canada in permitting same-sex couples to
marry, the next issue that will arise is whether those marriages will
be treated like other marriages and honored by other states,
provinces, and countries or whether they will face discrimination
and be refused recognition. Like all other U.S. same-sex couples
who married in Canada, my spouse and I also wonder whether our
marriage will be honored by those institutions (whether private or
public) with whom we will have dealings as a married couple.
Countless Canadian and U.S. opposite-sex couples have had their
Canadian marriages recognized and validated in this country. This
same question will arise when Massachusetts same-sex couples
leave their state and travel throughout this country and the world.32
3' This article refers to interstate recognition of Vermont civil unions
because the six cases discussed below concerned those relationships. But as
same-sex couples in civil unions, domestic partnerships, and reciprocal
beneficiary relationships seek legal remedies based on their coupled status,
courts will be faced with resolving issues relating to all three types of legal
status. Additionally, courts will soon be faced with marriages from
Massachusetts, Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and issues of whether
those marriages will be honored and validated. Although I believe marriages
have a stronger claim to interstate recognition, see But Why Not Marriage, supra
note 18, at 137-44, the analysis provided in this section can and should be used
by courts when addressing interstate recognition of any of these legal
relationships. See also Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic
Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 1235 (2001) (arguing that states will not be constitutionally required to
recognize other states' domestic partnerships, except when faced with judgments
concerning the partnerships); Robert Wintemute, Conclusion to LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 759, 769 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds.,
2001) (discussing how using a name other than marriage facilitates the task of
denying recognition to same-sex relationships: "Registered partnership? What's
that? We've never heard of it. It doesn't exist here.")
32 For a discussion of how recognition of international marriages may
differ from recognition of U.S. marriages in U.S. courts since neither the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the U.S. Constitution nor the Federal DOMA statutes
apply to foreign marriages, see Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the
[Vol. 13710
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They will join us in asking whether our marriages will be honored
as virtually all other marriages are honored, or whether we will
face discrimination from a society that somehow remains troubled
by using this term to describe our relationships.33
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health specifically
argued to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that
"expanding the institution of civil marriage in Massachusetts to
include same-sex couples will lead to interstate conflict."34 The
court responded by saying that it "would not presume to dictate
how an[y] other state [or country would] respond" to its ruling.
35
But it concluded with the following:
But neither should considerations of comity prevent us from
according Massachusetts residents the full measure of
protection available under the Massachusetts Constitution. The
genius of our Federal system is that each State's Constitution
has vitality specific to its own traditions, and that, subject to the
minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, each
State is free to address difficult issues of individual liberty in
the manner its own Constitution demands.
36
I have written many articles on interstate recognition of same-
sex relationships and whether the marriages of same-sex couples
entered into in one U.S. state would be honored and recognized
Conflict of Laws: The First Step on the Road to Divorce Is-Marriage, KING'S
C. L. J. (forthcoming March 2004) (manuscript at 11, 19, on file with author).
33 See Developments in the Law (pt. 3), Constitutional Constraints on
Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2028, 2050-51
(2003) [hereinafter Constitutional Constraints] (explaining that when courts are
comfortable with the unions of same-sex couples, they will view them as highly
analogous to traditional marriages, but when courts are uncomfortable with
these unions, they may reject the suggestion that cases involving interstate
recognition of same-sex couples' unions should be governed by the same
principles used for recognizing traditional marriages).
3' Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,967 (Mass. 2003).
35 Id.
36 Id.; see also Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571
(discussing whether same-sex couples' marriages from Massachusetts will be
recognized in other states as valid and how "personal residual prejudice against
same-sex couples" may continue).
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like most other out-of-state marriages in this country,37 or whether
our marriages would be treated in a manner not seen since the
prohibitions on interracial marriages were declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. 38 This issue arose in
the early 1990s during the second wave 39 of litigation seeking the
freedom for same-sex couples to marry that started with the
Hawaiian litigation and that state's supreme court decision in
Baehr v. Miike.4 0 At that time, I began researching the question of
whether a marriage in Hawaii or elsewhere would be recognized
when a same-sex couple returned home from an out-of-state
wedding ceremony in whatever state became the first to permit
marriages of same-sex couples. 41 As part of a group of law
professors, lawyers, and law students organized by Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, I supervised and edited a detailed
analysis of every state's marital recognition law. a2 Numerous
commentators on all sides of the issue have long been discussing
37 See Barbara J. Cox, Applying the Usual Marriage- Validation Rule to
Marriages of Same-Sex Couples, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A
DEBATE (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds, 2003); If We Marry, supra note 18; Barbara
J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law,
16 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 61 (1996) [hereinafter Public Policy Exception]; "The
Little Project," supra note 12; But Why Not Marriage, supra note 18; Barbara J.
Cox, Interstate Validation of Marriages and Civil Unions, 30 HUMAN RIGHTS 5
(2003).
38 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
39 During the first "wave" of litigation, several cases were tried in the late
1970s and early 1980s. All the courts that considered claims of marital rights for
same-sex couples rejected those challenges. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973);
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); If We Marry, supra note 18, at
1049 n.76 (citing additional cases).
40 Originally known as Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the case
became Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), and was later dismissed as
moot following an amendment to the Hawaii constitution in 1998, which limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples. See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw.
1999).
41 See If We Marry, supra note 18; see also Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive
Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68
S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1995) (discussing possible "first mover states" and the
economic benefits that would be realized by that state).
42 A discussion of this research can be found in Public Policy Exception,
supra note 37, at 61.
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whether courts would honor the legal relationships of same-sex
couples entered into in one state, province, or country when they
were seeking recognition of those relationships in another state,
province, or country.
43
Finally, we have cases within the European Union and within
the United States discussing recognition of same-sex couples' legal
relationships outside the jurisdiction in which they were formed.
Two cases from the European Union discuss whether the
relationships of same-sex couples will be treated the same as
relationships between opposite-sex couples. In Grant v. South-
West Trains Ltd,44  the Court of Justice of the European
Communities held that a woman was not entitled to travel
concessions for her same-sex partner, even though they were
provided by her employer to both the spouses and unmarried
partners of opposite-sex couples.45 In D and Kingdom of Sweden v.
Council,46 the Court of Justice held that D was not entitled to have
his Swedish registered partnership with his same-sex partner
treated the same as a marriage for purposes of obtaining a
household allowance provided to married officials. 47
43 In addition to my articles cited in supra note 37, for a representative
portion of the work addressing these issues, see, e.g., Symposium,
Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1-
239 (1996) and Symposium, Interjurisdictional Marriage Recognition, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1998); see also MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS (1999); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law,
and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Mark Strasser, For Whom the
Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998); Evan Wolfson, The Freedom to
Marry: Our Struggle for the Map of the Country, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209
(1996).
44 Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 1
CMLR 993 (1998).
45 Id. In this case, the court ruled that refusing to provide travel concessions
to the same-sex partner of an employee did not constitute equal pay
discrimination under Article 119 of the EC Treaty or Council Directive (EEC)
75/117.
46 Case C-122/99P and C-125/99P, D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council,
2001 E.C.R. 1-4319 (2001).
47 Id. In this case, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark, and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands all supported D's position. The court, in
rejecting the argument that the registered partnership must be treated the same as
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Some commentators have begun discussing these issues in
light of the number of European Union countries that permit
marriage or registered partnerships. They recognize that numerous
issues will arise as same-sex couples in relationships legally
recognized in their domiciles move or travel throughout the
world. 48 A reciprocal agreement does exist between Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden to recognize one another's registered
partnerships. 49 On February 11, 2003, the European Parliament
voted that the non-European Union citizen, same-sex partners of
European Union nationals should have the same right of residency
as spouses, if either the host country or home-member state treats
the couple the same as married couples.50 On April 15, 2003, the
European Commission tabled the amendments which would have
"give[n] the right of residence to the same-sex spouses [or]
a marriage for household allowance purposes, noted that under Swedish law
registered partnerships are not given all the rights of marriages. As long as the
Swedish legislature did not treat the two relationships as equal and prevented
same-sex couples from marriage, the European Community was also not
required to treat the two statuses as equal for these purposes. Id. at 33-38.
This same issue has and will arise with civil unions and domestic partnerships.
See But Why Not Marriage, supra note 18, at 137-44. How the Court of Justice
will handle the marriages of same-sex couples from the Netherlands and
Belgium, who are provided with the same rights as married opposite-sex
couples, is unclear, especially since a portion of the Court's decision focused on
the need for an interpretation that would fit the whole European community, not
individual member states. D & Kingdom of Denmark, 2001 E.C.R. 1-431 at
49.
48 See, e.g., Elspeth Guild, Free Movement and Same-Sex Relationships:
Existing EC Law and Article 13 EC, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL Law,
supra note 31, at 677, 677-89; Kees Waaldijk, Towards the Recognition of
Same-Sex Partners in European Union Law: Expectations Based on Trends in
National Law, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 635,
644-48; Wintemute, supra note 31, at 767-70 (on "portability of legal
recognition"); Caroline Forder, European Models of Domestic Partnership
Laws: The Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371, 433-34, 440-41 (2000)
(discussing the private international law aspects of recognizing same-sex
couples' legal relationships or marriages).
49 McClure, supra note 10, at 805; InchingDown the Aisle, supra note 6, at
2008 n.29.
50 Free Movement of People: MEPS Vote to Strengthen Residence Rights of
EU Citizens, EUR. REP., Feb. 12, 2003, at 461.
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registered or unmarried partners of E[uropean] U[nion] citizens." 51
At this point, the European Commission is not expected to address
a community-wide solution in the near future and will leave
recognition of the marriages or registered partnerships of same-sex
couples to the courts of the forum where the issue arises.52
Professor Katharina Boele-Woelki believes that the variety in the
forms of legal relationships in the European Union will cause
numerous private international law problems, and she anticipates
major legislative changes within a few years. 53
In September 2003, a same-sex couple from Canada was
denied recognition of their Canadian marriage when they tried to
enter the United States using a customs form declaring themselves
members of the same family.54 The customs agent refused to
recognize their marriage and required them to enter as single
individuals-something the two men would not do. Refusing to
"divorce" themselves to enter to U.S., they said, "We could have
gone in as single individuals, signed two forms, but to do that
would be an affront to our dignity and human rights." 55
Usually, principles of comity would lead another country,
state, or province to recognize another jurisdiction's marriage if the
marriage were valid under the local laws of that country. In this
way, countries recognize the laws of the couple's home country
and provide a way for married couples to move from country to
country or visit between countries, without leaving their marital
status at their own country's borders.
51 Free Movement of People: Commission Opposes Extending Right of
Residence to Same-sex Couples, EUR. REP., April 18, 2003, at 462.
52 Jennifer J. Lee, Gay 'Marriages' Tangle European Laws; Nations Differ
on Recognition of Rights of Migrants, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at A01. But
see E. U. to Expand Rights of Same-Sex Couples, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 25,
2003 (referring to European Union ministers endorsing "a set of rules that would
ensure recognition of the marriages of same-sex couples from the Netherlands
and Belgium throughout the [European] Union").
53 Marilyn Gardner, Ending Gay Marriage Ban Doesn t Resolve all Issues;
Netherlands Grapples with Legal Questions, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.),
Nov. 28, 2003, at A28. Professor Boele-Woelki has just published a book on
legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Europe.
54 Clifford Krauss, Married Gay Canadian Couple Barred from U.S., N.Y.




How this general rule works can be seen in two recent cases
where U.S. courts honored opposite-sex marriages entered into
other countries, even though the marriages were technically invalid
in those countries. In Xiong v. Xiong,56 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals considered whether the children of a woman could sue for
the wrongful death of their mother. Wisconsin law would not
permit the children to sue for wrongful death if their mother was
survived by her spouse.57 Although invalid under Laotian secular
law, the court held that the marriage was valid under "the
traditional ethnic law of the spouses," who believed in good faith
that they were married.58 Finding them qualified as putative
spouses, the husband was entitled to bring the wrongful death suit
as one of the incidents of marriage. 59 In Donlann v. Macgurn,60 the
Arizona Court of Appeals honored a marriage from Puerto
Vallarta, Mexico, despite its invalidity under Mexican law because
the person who officiated did not sign the marriage license.
6 1
Focusing instead on an Arizona statute that validated foreign
marriages if they would have been valid if performed in Arizona,
the court recognized the marriage using choice of law principles,
which it said permitted Arizona to "give the same incident to an
invalid foreign marriage that it would give to a marriage that has
been validly contracted within its territory."
62
In this same article, the author also discusses the Burns v.
Burns63 and Rosengarten v. Downes64 cases discussed below. It is
striking that the Georgia and Connecticut Courts of Appeals
56 648 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
57 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002.
Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 Am. J. COMp. L. 1, 82 (2003) (citing Xiong v.
Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 905-906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)).
58 Id. at 83 (citing Xiong v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002)).
59 Id. (citing Xiong v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)).
The Court also determined that their three years spent in Pennsylvania would
entitle them to be recognized as common law status. Id.
60 55 P.3d 74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
61 Id.; Symeonides, supra note 57, at 83.
62 Symeonides, supra note 57, at 83-84 (quoting Donlann v. Maggum, 55
P.3d 74, 79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)).
63 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
64 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
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refused to honor civil unions validly entered into and celebrated in
Vermont by same-sex couples, even while their counterpart courts
in Wisconsin and Arizona went to such lengths to honor marriages
by opposite-sex couples that were not even valid where celebrated.
It is striking that courts can so clearly alter their willingness to
follow the general rule promoting validation, the parties'
reasonable expectations, and protecting the couple depending
simply on whether the couple before the court is an opposite-sex
one or a same-sex one.
Despite discussions for over ten years, we still do not have any
decisions on interstate or international recognition of marriages by
same-sex couples. We do have, however, six cases in the United
States on the interstate recognition and validation of Vermont civil
unions. In these six cases, same-sex couples from six different
states who had entered into Vermont civil unions came to their
courts seeking resolution of legal issues that arose in their
relationships. The rest of this article now turns to these six
decisions and considers how each court dealt with the same-sex
couple seeking legal assistance with the problems that had arisen
for them. I review each case and consider whether each court could
have recognized the civil union for the particular incident of
marriage 65 at issue in the case. I also consider whether using that
analysis and prior precedent in each state should have led each
court to recognize the civil union for, at least the limited purpose
raised in the lawsuit.
65 Obviously, previous cases concerning whether an opposite-sex couple
could receive an incident of marriage only had to address legal marriages and
common law marriages. Unlike opposite-sex couples whose interracial,
underage, incestuous, or polygamous marriages or remarriages were questioned,
only same-sex relationships have generated the variety of alternative institutions.
Thus, although these alternative institutions are limited to same-sex couples,
when talking about incidents of marriage, I do consider "incidents of marriage"
that would arise whether the same-sex couples has entered a marriage, a civil
union, or a domestic partnership.
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A. Recognizing the Parties 'Legal Relationship Universally
or Recognizing the "Incident of Marriage"
at Issue in the Case
When first writing about interstate recognition of the
marriages of same-sex couples, I argued that same-sex couples in
ongoing relationships need to have the status as married couples
recognized universally, rather than being required to seek
66
recognition for each incident of marriage as the need arose.
Courts regularly view the term "marriage" as "an all-purpose
concept.' 67 For same-sex couples in ongoing relationships who
will be interacting with numerous governmental and private
institutions, this "universal" recognition of the status as a married
couple is vital. Same-sex couples should not have to live with the
uncertainty and expense that would arise from having to litigate
one incident of marriage at a time, rather than having the marriages
honored on a universal basis.
68
But there are occasions, well-illustrated by the six cases
considering interstate recognition of Vermont civil unions,
discussed below, when the same-sex couple's marriage, civil
union, or domestic partnership could, and should, be recognized at
least with regard to the particular incident of marriage involved,
even if a court were to refuse to honor it universally within the
forum state. 69 "Incidents of marriage" refer to each of the specific
66 See If We Marry, supra note 18, at 1063 n. 168.
67 Willis L. M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 952, 952 (1977).
68 Additional problems with an issue-by-issue determination of rights and
responsibilities include uncertainty and arbitrariness. See Inching Down the
Aisle, supra note 6, at 2024-25 (discussing how a "functional" approach to
recognizing or rejecting same-sex unions "perpetuates the second-class status of
same-sex couples, leaving them uncertain as to their rights and responsibilities
and denying them the symbolic 'recognition of shared humanity' that
accompanies legalization of marriage").
6 Let me clarify again that I believe a same-sex couple's marriage, validly
entered into under the law of the place of celebration, should usually be
universally honored as valid everywhere. That is the general rule found in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) which states:
"A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship
[Vol. 13
"INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
benefits, rights, or responsibilities flowing to a married couple
based on their marital status. Professor Willis Reese, Reporter for
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws,70 and others in the late
1960s through 1980, argued that courts should develop choice-of-
law rules for marriage, not as a universal status, but rather by
considering the issue facing the court in each particular case, the
policies behind the incident of marriage at issue, and whether the
couple should be viewed as married for that purpose. 71 As Reese
explained:
In the great majority of situations, the validity of the marriage
will be a question that is incidental to the determination of
another issue. This is so, for example, when a person, claiming
to be a surviving spouse, asserts rights to testate or intestate
succession, to pension, social security or work[ers']
compensation benefits, or to recover under the life insurance
policy or for the wrongful death of the other spouse .... The
problem is whether in these situations the validity of the
marriage should first be established independently of the other
issue involved or whether determination of the validity of the
marriage should be made with reference to that issue.
72
When discussing how courts decide marriage recognition
cases, Professor J. David Fine concluded: "It appears that the most
important factor in a court's assessment of the law to be used in
passing upon the validity of marriage is the issue giving rise to the
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." The meaning of the
exception for violations of strong public policies has been extensively discussed
in the literature. See, e.g., If We Marry, supra note 18; Public Policy Exception,
supra note 37; Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
71 Reese, supra note 67. See also Hans W. Baade, Marriage and Divorce in
American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and the Restatement
(Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 329 (1972); David E. Engdahl, Proposal for a
Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 56 (1969-1970); J. David Fine, The Application of Issue-Analysis to
Choice of Law Involving Family Law Matters in the United States, 26 LOY. L.
REV. 31 (1980).
72 Reese, supra note 67, at 953.
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litigation.',73 Professor Fine considers numerous issues arising
during a marriage, including capacity to marry, benefits for
widows, and succession by children.
74
Additionally, Professors Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick
J. Borchers, and Symeon C. Symeonides, in their treatise on
conflict of laws, noted that scholars repeatedly have pointed out
that:
[T]he courts could and should treat all questions simply as
claims to incidents but such has not been the course of the
decisions .... [I]n recent choice-of-law cases, the courts have
begun to recognize that the enjoyment of different incidents of
marriage involves different policies. Consequently, a uniform
reference to a single state to resolve all choice-of-law questions
involving marriage cannot be expected.
75
They conclude that "[l]ike other issues, the dominant policies
and significant relationships relevant to the particular issue
including the purpose for which the determination of status is
pertinent will guide the court in seeking a just result."
76
Even when faced with a marriage prohibited in the forum by a
state statute, a court does not have to reject the marriage for all
purposes. These authors explain that although the statute
prohibiting the marriage does show a policy against the marriage,
the policy thus expressed runs afoul, in these cases, of other
policies which are well settled, whether expressed in positive
terms by statute or not. One is the general policy upholding a
marriage whenever possible. Others relate to the particular
73 Fine, supra note 71, at 33. See also Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex
Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 559-60 (1994).
14 Fine, supra note 71.
75 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.2 (3d ed. 2000)
(citations omitted); see also Constitutional Constraints, supra note 33, at 2049-
50 (noting modern scholars have suggested use of an "incidents of marriage"
approach, rather than considering a marriage's universal validity, before
considering the issue raised in the case).
76 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 75, § 13.3.
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issue involved .... The controlling issue becomes whether the
policy of prohibition, as expressed by the legislative body, is
strong enough in regard to the particular issue before the court
to prevail over the policies furthered by upholding the
marriage.7
They conclude that usually the court will have to decide which
of these competing policies should be given the greatest weight.
78
Professor David Engdahl, another proponent of an "incidents
of marriage" approach, has argued that granting or denying validity
to a marriage on a universal basis, as opposed to considering its
validity on an issue-by-issue basis, frequently defeats the state's
strong public policies that are expressed by providing particular
rights and benefits to married couples.
Those [conflicts] rules, for their part, are grounded, not on
policies concerning, for example, succession to property or
welfare expenditures, but on policies concerning the conditions
under which persons should be permitted to cohabit. The
consequence is that entitlement to rights is determined with
reference to policies extraneous to those on which the law
conferring those rights is based, and often in derogation of
some strong policy sought to be achieved by that law.
79
Engdahl pointed out that when a marriage prohibited by the
forum state's law escapes discovery until after any opportunity to
challenge it has passed, such as when one spouse has died or when
the relationship has ended, denying the rights that normally attach
to the marriage is not effective to affirm the policy behind the
marriage restriction.
8 0
At best, it is a sterile vindication of the policy of the marriage
laws, often at great human expense to a party who, through
good faith, or ignorance, or carelessness, or naivete, or because
he or she belonged to a subculture whose marital habits did not
"7Id. § 13.9.
78 Id.
79 Engdahl, supra note 71, at 105.
80 Id. at 105-06.
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conform nicely to the law, is found to have offended the
81
norm.
For example, Engdahl questioned whether the purpose behind
Social Security benefits or workers' compensation benefits is to
punish a person for failing to follow the forum's marriage laws or
rather to provide benefits to survivors who were dependent on the
decedent for support. 82 Applying this analysis to several situations,
he points out that (a) a surviving spouse's right to workers'
compensation benefits should be based on the policies behind that
law to support survivors, not on the policies designed to prevent
"undesirable forms of cohabitation;" (b) a divorcing spouse's right
to alimony should be based on whether the policies underlying the
right to alimony would be served, not on the policies about
whether the husband's ex parte divorce was valid; (c) a
polygamist's right to cohabit with two wives should be based on
the state's policies concerning cohabitation, not on policies of
whether his marriage in another country was valid or void; and (d)
multiple wives' rights to inherit property from their bigamist
husband should be based on the state's policies concerning
intestate succession, not on policies in that state on cohabitation.
83
While recognition of a same-sex couple's ongoing relationship
may sometimes require a court to determine its marital status on a
universal basis, other courts should instead consider whether
recognizing the couple's marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership would promote the policies behind the particular
incident at issue in the case before them. Although some couples
will request universal recognition of their ongoing relationship,
other couples may only seek recognition of some more limited
aspect of their relationship. By considering only the incident of
marriage before the court and the policies behind providing that
incident of marriage to married couples, some courts may
recognize the marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership for
that particular purpose, even while refusing to honor the
relationship for other purposes.
81 Id. at 106.
82 Id.
" Id. at 109.
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This approach has been followed by the courts in numerous
cases. Three well-known cases discussed below are examples of
courts faced with marriages as vigorously prohibited by the
forum's marriage statutes as some of the statutes prohibiting
marriages by same-sex couples: a polygamous marriage, an
interracial marriage, and a remarriage after a divorce based on
adultery. 84 In each case, the court granted the incident of marriage
to the spouse(s) while noting that it would have refused recognition
of the marriage on a universal basis. Each case provides insights
for courts considering whether to recognize a same-sex couple's
marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership.
In the case of Estate ofDalip Singh Bir',5 the Court of Appeal
of California was faced with a petition by Harnam Kaur and Jiwi,
the wives of decedent Dalip Singh Bir, for equal shares in the
estate of their husband.86 The trial court found that both marriages
entered into in India were valid under its laws, that only the first
wife would be recognized in California as the widow of the
decedent, and that the case needed to be continued pending proof
of which marriage was first.
87
On appeal, the court of appeal reviewed the prior cases
involving recognition of polygamous marriages and found that
several U.S. cases did recognize those marriages for certain
purposes, including succession to property. 88  The court
acknowledged the trial court's concern with "public policy," but
believed that policy concerns "would apply only if decedent had
attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California." 89 Finding
that public policy was not affected by a case involving only
succession to property and noting no cases opposed to that
84 Actually, many of these restrictions are stronger than the ones leveled
against same-sex couples because many involved criminal penalties for their
violation and attached felony status and prison sentences. See Andrew
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation
Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 105, 108-09 (1996) [hereinafter The
Miscegenation Precedents].
85 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
86 Id. at 499. The wives were still residents of India, and the husband had
been a resident of India when he entered into both marriages. Id.
87 Id. at 499-500.




conclusion, the court held that the two wives should share equally
in decedent's estate.
90
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized an
interracial couple's out-of-state marriage for purposes of intestate
succession even though the Mississippi Constitution and its state
statutes prohibited interracial marriage within that state.9' The
couple, an African-American woman and a white man, were
indicted in Mississippi in 1923 for unlawful cohabitation, but the
case was dropped when the woman agreed to leave the state. In
1939, they were legally married in Illinois and they lived together
until the wife's death.
The attorneys for the heirs challenging the validity of the
marriage argued:
In Mississippi marriages between whites and negroes are
considered unnatural, and so odious as to offend a deep rooted
sense of morality predominate in the state; and being abhorrent
to the morals and customs of its society, such marriages are
declared to be contrary to the public policy of the state and
absolutely void.
92
90 Id. But see People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992) (holding that polygamous marriage was "absolutely void" in New York,
although valid under Nigerian law where it was celebrated, and thus did not
provide a defense to a charge of rape of the defendant's thirteen year old,
"junior" wife). For a discussion of courts refusing to recognize the children of
U.S. nationals as legitimate for immigration purposes due to the fact they were
from their parents' second marriages validly entered into in China, see Ng Suey
Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927); Constitutional Constraints,
supra note 33, at 2041 (discussing a court's "refus[al] to tolerate polygamous
cohabitation on American soil [and] refus[al] to countenance any attempt by the
would-be immigrant to gain any privileges by virtue of the polygamous
marriage"). It is important to note that all these cases involved a question of
recognizing foreign polygamous marriages as a way to gain ongoing benefits in
the United States.
9' Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).
92 Id. at 140. Reading this language in 2004 is quite troubling, but I
included it to emphasize that the opposition to the marriages of interracial
couples in 1948 in Mississippi was as strong, if not stronger, than the opposition
to the marriages of same-sex couples today. See also Eggers v. Olson, 231 P.
483, 484-85 (Okla. 1924); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 755 (Va. 1955).
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that both the state
constitution and its state statutes voided any marriage between a
white person and a person with "one-eighth or more of negro
blood."03 Concluding that neither statute should be given extra-
territorial effect, it held that the valid Illinois marriage "must be
recognized and given effect as such unless so to do violates this
statute or the state's public policy as declared therein." 94 The court
emphasized that the parties were married in Illinois and that neither
party returned to Mississippi after they left. Finding that the
"manifest and recognized purpose of this statute was to prevent
persons of Negro and white blood from living together in this state
in the relationship of husband and wife," permitting one spouse to
inherit property in the state "does no violence" to the purposes of
the constitutional and statutory prohibitions. 95 Finding that cases
from other states "faced with this Negro problem" reached the
same conclusion, the court recognized the marriage "to the extent
only of permitting one of the parties thereto to ... inherit from the
other property in Mississippi."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania faced the issue of
whether to recognize a second marriage validly entered into by its
domiciliaries in West Virginia. 97 Each of the spouses, while living
in Pennsylvania, had been married previously and each was
divorced from their prior spouse based on their adultery with the
other.98 They wanted to marry but Pennsylvania statute section 169
prevented those guilty of the crime of adultery from marrying "the
person with whom the said crime was committed, during the life of
93 Miller, 36 So.2d at 141 (citing MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. 14, § 263
(repealed 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942) (both stating such marriages
are "unlawful and void")).
94 id.
9' Id. at 142.
96 Id. (citing Whittington v. McCaskill, 61 So. 236 (Fla. 1913); Caballero
v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (La. 1872) (both recognizing out-of-state
interracial marriages for succession to property purposes, while noting that the
marriages would have been invalid for purposes of ongoing cohabitation)). See
also The Miscegenation Precedents, supra note 84, at 119-26, and cases cited
therein.
97 Lenherr Estate, 314 A.2d 255, 256 (Pa. 1974).98Id. at 256-57.
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the former wife or husband." 99 Thus, they traveled to West
Virginia to marry, returned to Pennsylvania to live, and lived there
together until the husband's death.' 00
Then the wife sought a marital exemption from the property
transfer tax that was permitted under state inheritance law.' After
deciding that the remarriage prohibition contained in section 169
applied to those divorced due to adultery, not just to those
convicted in a criminal proceeding, and thus Pennsylvania law
prevented the couple from marrying, 10 2 the court determined
whether West Virginia law or Pennsylvania law applied to the
case.
The court followed the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws and referred to the principles in section 6 and section 283 to
guide its analysis. 103 Noting the strong policy favoring uniformity
of result in marriage cases, the court noted in a time of
"widespread travel and ease of mobility, it would create inordinate
confusion and defy the reasonable expectations of citizens whose
marriage is valid in one state to hold that marriage invalid
elsewhere."t
0 4
Concluding that Pennsylvania had the "most significant
relationship" to the spouses and the marriage, 10 5 the court focused
99 Id. at 257 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Supp. 1978)).
1oo Id.
o" Id. at 256.
102 Id. at 257.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 283 (1971). The
principles in section 6 are intended to guide courts when deciding between
conflicting laws in marriage recognition cases. Those principles are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). For the language of
section 283, see supra note 69.
104 Lenherr Estate, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974). The court also noted its
concern that couples might try to circumvent legitimate state policies by the
"sham of travelling [sic] to a nearby less stringent jurisdiction." Id.
105 This refers to the standard contained in section 283 of Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
[Vol. 13726
"INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
on whether the policy behind section 169 was so strong that it must
control the case, "thereby destroying the uniformity of result which
is so desirable in a case concerning the recognition of a marriage
that is valid in the state where it was contracted."'10 6 The court was
clear that the strength of the policy supporting section 169
depended "to a significant degree" upon the incident of marriage"
at issue in the case. 10 7 Thus it balanced the policy behind section
169 "as it relates to the marital exemption to the inheritance tax,
against the need for uniformity and predictability of result."'
10 8
The court concluded that the policy behind section 169 was
not to punish the adulterous spouses so much as to protect "the
sensibilities of the injured and innocent husband or wife ... to be
wounded, or the public decency to be affronted, by being forced to
witness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair."'09 While
concluding that this policy might be significant "with respect to
cohabitation, and many other incidents of marriage, '' O it would
not be furthered by denying the surviving spouse the tax exemption
because any such affront caused by the second marriage ended
with the husband's death."' The court determined that the policy
behind the tax exemption for transfers of property between spouses
on one spouse's death recognized that jointly held property was "in
reality the product of their joint efforts and should pass to the
survivor without the imposition of a tax." 112 Noting that this policy
would be "frustrated" by applying section 169 to this marriage and
that the policy behind section 169 was "significantly outweighed
by countervailing policies," the court refused to invalidate the
marriage." 1
3
Writing about Lenherr Estate, Professor Reese noted that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania




109Id. at 259 (quoting In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1898), although








did not follow the usual practice of first determining, without
regard to the principal issue involved, whether the marriage
was either valid or invalid. Instead, it addressed itself
immediately to the principal issue .... It made entirely clear
that it would have held the marriage invalid for other purposes
as, for example, whether the parties could lawfully cohabit with
one another. In other words, the court did not treat marriage as
an all-purpose concept. This is in line with the approach
suggested here. 114
When same-sex couples are litigating their marital status in an
ongoing relationship, they need judicial decisions that embrace the
universality principle and recognize their marriages as valid for all
purposes. Some courts, however, will be unwilling to recognize the
marriage for all purposes, although they may be willing to
recognize the marriage for more limited purposes. Additionally,
other courts will not be confronted with whether the relationship
should be recognized as an ongoing marriage with all the rights
and responsibilities that other married couples enjoy because the
parties may be seeking dissolution of the marriage or other
incidents of marriage that arise only upon the death of one of the
spouses. In such situations, courts should consider the particular
incident of marriage at issue and the public policy reasons for
providing that incident to married couples, and they may find it
appropriate to validate the marriage at least for those limited
purposes.
In the six cases discussed below, four involved petitions for
dissolution of the couples' civil union status and separation of the
couples" property and debts. Another case involved whether a
couple's civil union satisfied an earlier custody decree permitting
each parent to have visits of their minor children so long as only
that parent's spouse shared the parent's household. The final case
involved a lawsuit for wrongful death by a surviving spouse
acknowledged by the decedent's blood family as that person's
spouse.
In each case, the courts should have recognized the civil union
between the couple and provided them with the assistance that they
114 Reese, supra note 67, at 970.
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sought. In no case, except perhaps Burns,115 was the court
confronted with the question of acknowledging an ongoing same-
sex relationship within the forum. Three cases provided their
citizens with the help they sought (two of which are on appeal),' 16
and three refused their citizens that assistance. By reviewing the
cases and the policies at issue, we can see how focusing on the
particular issue at hand may lead courts to recognize the legal
relationships of same-sex couples for some purposes, even when
they may be unwilling to recognize their status for all purposes.
B. Decisions of Courts Where the Same-Sex Couple Was Seeking
Dissolution of Their Civil Union
1. Connecticut-Appellate Court Refused
to Grant Dissolution
In July 2002, the Appellate Court of Connecticut released its
decision in Rosengarten v. Downes.117 In this case, the court
showed a surprising reluctance to provide assistance to one of its
own citizens. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut was
dismissed as moot after Glen Rosengarten died while the appeal
was pending. "18
Glen Rosengarten, a resident of Connecticut, filed an action to
dissolve the civil union that he and his partner, Peter Downes, a
resident of New York, entered into in Vermont in December
115 Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In Burns, the court
considered whether a civil union entered into in Vermont by one parent with her
same-sex partner was sufficiently similar to a marriage so as to permit visitation
of the woman's three minor children while her same-sex partner was present in
the house. Thus, even this case is not about the civil union itself but about its
sufficiency within that context.
116 See Lambda Legal Asks New York Appeals Court to Allow Gay Man to
Continue Pursuing Wrongful Death Case as a Spouse and Uphold Historic
Ruling for Same-Sex Couples, LAMBDA LEGAL, Jan. 20, 2004, at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record= 1415 (last
visited June 12, 2004); Alons v. Judge of the Iowa Dist. Ct., petition for cert.
filed (Iowa Dec. 15, 2003), cert. granted (Iowa Jan. 12, 2004).
1 " 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
118 Janice G. Inman, Dissolving a Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. FAM. L.
MONTHLY, July 11, 2003, at 1. The Supreme Court's order granting the appeal
can be found at 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002).
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2000.119 His complaint stated that the civil union had broken down
irretrievably and asked the court to dissolve the civil union. 120 The
trial court dismissed Rosengarten's complaint, finding that it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action because the
civil union did not fall within the court's broad powers under
Connecticut General Statutes section' 46b-1 .121 The appellate court
affirmed the court's decision, agreeing that the superior court had
no jurisdiction over Rosengarten's complaint.' 22
Without repeating all of the court's lengthy explanation of why
subject matter jurisdiction did not exist in this case, a few points
merit attention. After finding that none of the first sixteen
subsections of Connecticut General Statutes section' 46b-1
provided subject matter jurisdiction for the case,123 the court
concluded that subsection 17 also did not apply. That subsection
states:
Matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court deemed to
be family relations matters shall be matters affecting or
involving ... (17) all such other matters within the jurisdiction
of the Superior Court concerning children or family relations
as may be determined by the judges of said court. 124
119 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
120 Civil unions entered into in Vermont may be dissolved in Vermont only
after one of the spouses has been a resident of the state for one year. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592 (2002).
121 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 172.
122 Id. at 184.
123 It is somewhat surprising that the court concluded that "clearly" none of
the following subsections of section 46b-1 were potentially applicable to the
case:
Matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court deemed to be family
relations matters shall be matters affecting or involving: (1) Dissolution of
marriage . . .; (2) legal separation; (3) annulment of marriage; (4) alimony,
support, custody and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage,
legal separation and annulment ... ; [and] (15) actions related to prenuptial
and separation agreements and to matrimonial decrees of a foreign
jurisdiction ....
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-1 (West 2004).
124 Id. § 46b- 1(17) (emphasis added).
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At the end of its decision, the court stated "we conclude that a
civil union is not a family relations matter. ... ,25 It is difficult to
understand how the civil union of a same-sex couple in Vermont
whereby they are entitled, in Vermont at least, to "receive the
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
spouses, '' 12 6 is anything but a "family relations matter." Given the
breadth of the jurisdiction stated in subsection 17 over "all such
other matters," it is hard to understand why the court took such
steps to avoid requiring the trial court to hear the plaintiffs
complaint.
The court then proceeded through a lengthy analysis,
considering the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, other Connecticut statutes, and common law
principles, finding no support for the idea that dissolution of the
civil union of one of its citizens could fall within the court's
subject matter jurisdiction as a "family relations matter." This is
true even though Connecticut statutes expressly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; the court
dismissed this argument by concluding that the legislature
expressly stated that the state's policy against discrimination did
not mean the state had a policy condoning same-sex
relationships.' 2 7 This is true even though Connecticut statutes
permit second parent adoption by the nonbiological parent in a
same-sex relationship; the court dismissed this argument by
concluding that, even by recognizing this parental relationship with
the child's biological parent, the legislature had no intention of
endorsing same-sex relationships.'12  This is true even though
25 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 184.
26 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2003).
12' Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 179-80; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81a
to 46a-81r (West 2004). Section 46a-81r does state: "Nothing in [the
nondiscrimination statutes] shall be .. . construed (1) to mean the state of
Connecticut condones homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle..
. [or] (4) to authorize the recognition of or the right of marriage between persons
of the same sex .... "
128 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 180-81; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-724
to 45a-737 (West 1993). The court also quotes section 5 of the bill that states
that "nothing in this act shall be construed to establish or constitute an
endorsement of any public policy with respect to marriage, civil union or any
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Connecticut has no statute refusing to recognize out-of-state
marriages or civil unions; the court dismissed this argument by
concluding that the legislature thought it unnecessary to pass such
a bill.'2 9
For every argument the plaintiff made for finding subject
matter jurisdiction in the courts to dissolve his civil union, the
court responded by saying that Connecticut had no policy
endorsing same-sex relationships and thus, its courts could not
grant a dissolution. But nowhere did the plaintiff ask the court to
endorse his Vermont civil union with his same-sex partner.
Instead, he simply asked the court to let him legally dissolve that
relationship. Plaintiff was not seeking recognition of his Vermont
civil union for purposes of obtaining marital benefits in
Connecticut flowing from that union. Rather, he simply asked for
help in dissolving his civil union in Connecticut, rather than having
to return to Vermont to do so (something that seemingly would
have been difficult to do given his ill health).
After rejecting the plaintiffs statutory arguments, the court
also rejected his arguments based on language from Boland v.
Catalano,130 where the Supreme Court of Connecticut indicated
that its "courts should "enforce express contracts between
nonmarital partners ... [and] [i]n the absence of an express
contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to
determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract,
agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit
understanding between the parties."'13' The Rosengarten court
noted that the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Boland held that
courts may provide "'equitable remedies' when warranted by the
facts of the case."'1 32 Amazingly, the appellate court in Rosengarten
other form of relation between unmarried persons." Id. at 181 (citing 43 S. Proc.,
Pt. 8, 2000 Sess., at 2457 (Conn. 2000)).
129 Id. at 1 82.The court says that "the legislative history reveals that the
legislature failed to enact its own version of the ["so-called"] Defense of
Marriage Act not because it intended to evince a willingness to recognize civil
unions but because it thought such an enactment unnecessary." The court bases
this conclusion on a conversation between two state senators indicating their
belief that such a bill was superfluous. Id.
130 521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987).
131 Id. at 146 (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976)).
132 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 183 (quoting Boland, 521 A.2d at 146).
[Vol. 13
"INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE" ANALYSIS
concluded "[i]f before or during purportedly entering the Vermont
civil union, the parties to this action entered an implied or express
contract to 'share their earnings and the fruits of their joint labor,'
the court had jurisdiction to grant relief in law or equity as to that
claim." ' 33 However, the court refused to use the equitable power
granted to it by Boland to provide such equitable remedy because
it said the plaintiff had not alleged any "express or implied
agreements" in the complaint and because the plaintiff had not
"distinctly claimed on appeal that jurisdiction might be exercised
on this ground."'134 The plaintiff did appeal the lower court's
complete denial of any basis for jurisdiction over his case. Surely,
an equitable basis for jurisdiction would have survived the appeal.
Finally, it is important to remember that Glen Rosengarten
was not asking the court to recognize an ongoing civil union and to
provide it with the same status in Connecticut that it had in
Vermont. He went to the court as a citizen of Connecticut who
wanted to dissolve a civil union he entered into in Vermont. The
court, to permit the dissolution in the Superior Court of
Connecticut, could have determined that dissolution of another
state's civil union was sufficiently a "family relations matter."
Even without such a finding, the court could have decided that the
civil union evinced an implied or express contract between the
parties, and Rosengarten was entitled to rescind that contract by
dissolving the parties' civil union.
As Professor Herma Hill Kay noted when writing about this
case:
[T]he most striking aspect of the appellate court's opinion is
that virtually all of its analysis is devoted to same-sex marriage,
rather than to same-sex divorce. Yet the only issue before the
trial court was whether plaintiff, a citizen and resident of
Connecticut, could have access to the superior court to dissolve
a legal relationship he contracted in Vermont. 135
Professor Kay questioned why the court looked at the issue of
divorce jurisdiction only from the perspective of its marriage law,
133 Id. (quoting Boland, 521 A.2d at 146).
134 id.
135 Kay, supra note 32, at 51.
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and its conclusion that the plaintiff could not have entered into a
marriage or civil union with his same-sex partner in Connecticut.
Professor Kay also questioned why that conclusion on
Connecticut's marriage law should control the plaintiffs request to
dissolve his Vermont civil union.
1 36
If the court had focused on the question of divorce, and if it had
kept clearly in mind that plaintiff did not ask to be allowed to
cohabit in Connecticut with his partner in the Vermont civil
union but rather to be freed of any such obligation, and-most
significantly-if it had been able to put aside its obvious
concern that to recognize the civil union for purposes of its
dissolution might require it in future cases to recognize such
unions for all purposes, it might have reached a different
conclusion. 137
The question remains, why did the appellate court go to such
lengths to avoid helping its own citizen in what must have been a
difficult and challenging situation? Glen Rosengarten asked his
home state's court to help him dissolve a relationship that was
irretrievably broken, rather than forcing him to leave his domicile
and move to Vermont solely to end his civil union.
Additionally, there is precedent in Connecticut that the
appellate court should have considered in deciding whether to
dissolve the civil union, even if the precedent would not have
permitted Rosengarten to obtain other incidents of marriage in
Connecticut based on the civil union. In Delaney v. Delaney,138 a
Connecticut Superior Court judge granted the wife's petition for
dissolution of a marriage that was celebrated in Rhode Island by
Rhode Island domiciliaries, despite Connecticut's longstanding
policy against permitting common law marriages to be created in
the state.1 39 Finding that a marriage's validity was governed by the
law where it was contracted, the court noted that only marriages
that were invalid as incestuous were excepted from the validation
136Id. at 53.
137 d.
13' 405 A.2d 91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
139 Id. at 92.
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rule. 14  Even in Parker v. Parker, 14  where the Connecticut
Superior Court held that a second marriage in Connecticut was
void before the husband's divorce from his first marriage in
Massachusetts was final, the court still provided relief to the wife
and ordered the husband to pay her alimony. 142 In Anderson v.
Anderson, 143 the court looked to the law of New York to decide
whether to annul a second marriage celebrated in New York while
the wife's first marriage was still valid. 144 Finding the second
marriage to be void at its inception, the court still granted an
annulment and gave the wife custody of the children and support
from the husband.
In each of these cases, the Connecticut courts provided help to
its citizens by extending some incident of marriage (even just
dissolution) to them. Similarly, the appellate court could have
dissolved Rosengarten's civil union, even if it were unwilling to
recognize it for any other purpose. Denying Rosengarten's petition
for dissolution was not required by Connecticut's statutory law nor
by prior precedent. Unfortunately, due to the dismissal of the
appeal, we do not know how the Connecticut Supreme Court might
have ruled in the case.
140 Id. (citing Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 1961)
(invalidating an Italian marriage between an uncle and a niece that was valid
under Italian law, and finding that the public policy against incestuous marriages
in Connecticut was very strong since the penalty at the time was imprisonment
for up to ten years)). No similar public policy exists in Connecticut against the
legal relationships of same-sex couples because Connecticut has never passed an
antimarriage statute. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 182 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002). However, the appellate court held that the legislature did not
pass such a statute "not because it intended to evince a willingness to recognize
civil unions but because it thought such an enactment unnecessary." Id. Without
such a statute, however, it is difficult to believe that Connecticut has decided
that entering into a civil union would so "shock the conscience" that it could not
be recognized in the state for any purpose. See Delaney, 405 A.2d at 92.
141 270 A.2d 94 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970).
141 Id. at 94-96 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 46-28, which then
permitted courts to order alimony following an annulment, just as they could
award alimony upon divorce).
14' 238 A.2d 45 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967).
144 Id. at 46.
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2. Texas-Trial Court Refused to
Grant Dissolution
In one of the more bizarre of these six cases, the District Court
of Jefferson County, Texas, initially dissolved the civil union
between R.S. and J.A., but later vacated its decision after the Texas
Attorney General intervened. The district court had determined
that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the petitioner had
been a domiciliary of Texas for a sufficient length of time to be
eligible to seek divorce in Texas. 145
After finding that it had jurisdiction, the court decreed that
R.S. and S.A. were" "divorced and that the civil union between
them [was] dissolved on the ground of insupportability."1 46 It then
determined that the parties had entered into an enforceable contract
that divided their property in a "just and right division."'147 The
court listed the separate property of each party (including each
person's retirement accounts and the businesses they owned) and
divided their debts. Thus, the court treated the couple the same as
any other couple facing divorce and dissolved their legal
relationship with each other.
Once the divorce was final and reported in the media, on
March 27, 2003, the Texas Attorney General, Greg Abbott, issued
a press release stating that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the case "because Texas law does not
provide for dissolution of a civil union, and a divorce cannot be
granted where a marriage never existed."'148 Thus, according to
Abbott, "the court's final decree of divorce [was] void as a matter
of law."'149 On March 28, 2003, Judge Tom Mulvaney vacated his
decree.
This claim by Abbott, of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
seems contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Dubai
141 In re R.S. and J.A., No. F-185063 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Tex.,
Mar. 3, 2003) (unpublished decision on file with author).
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 8.
148 Jerry Simoneaux, Greg Abbott's Divine Contradiction, TEXAS
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Petroleum Co. v. Kazi.150 In that case, the Court held that a Texas
district court is a court of general jurisdiction and "[t]hus, all
claims are presumed to fall within the jurisdiction of the district
court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that they
must be heard elsewhere."
15
'
Prior marriage validation cases in Texas illustrate the state's
strong public policy in favor of recognizing marriages. In Texas
Employers Insurance Ass "n v. Elder,152 the supreme court held
that "[t]he presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage
which, as in this case, has been duly shown to have been
contracted is one of the strongest, if, indeed, not the strongest,
known to law."' 153 Thus, even though the surviving spouse had
entered into a common law marriage previously and no evidence
existed that it had been terminated, her second common law
marriage was honored. Therefore, she was entitled to death
benefits under the workers' compensation laws. The court stated
that "[iut is well that the presumption should be so regarded, for it
is grounded upon a sound public policy which favors morality,
innocence, marriage, and legitimacy[,] rather than immorality,
guilt, concubinage, and bastardy."' 54 In Houston Oil Co. v.
Griggs,155 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals also validated a
common law marriage between a man and a woman who was his
son's widow. 156 Finding that they left Florida to come to Texas,
where their marriage was not prohibited, the court noted that
marriages "should be considered with great liberality, and,
wherever it is possible so to do, to solve all doubt affecting the
matrimonial relationship in favor of sustaining such
relationship."1
57
"s0 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000).
151 Id. at 75.
152 282 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1955).
"' Id. at 373.
154 Id. The court went on to say that "when a marriage has been duly
established its legality will be presumed, and the burden of proving the contrary
is upon the one attacking its legality." Id. at 374. Interestingly in this case, no
one attacked the validity of the parties' Vermont civil union, except the Texas
Attorney General who was not a party before the court.
155 181 S.W. 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915).




Contrary to this strong presumption in favor of the marriages
of opposite-sex couples, Texas's antimarriage statute denies all
same-sex couples from marrying."" 158 After the decision In re R.S.
and J.A., 159 the Texas legislature passed and the governor signed a
bill which provided the following': "A marriage between persons
of the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of
this state and is void in this state."'1 60 The law further defined a
civil union as an "alternative to marriage" that "grants to the parties
of the relationship legal protections, benefits, or responsibilities
granted to the spouses of a marriage." 161 Thus, Texas joined
Nebraska as the second state specifically declaring that a Vermont
civil union will not be honored in that state. 162 Given these Texas
statutes stating that the marriages and civil unions of same-sex
couples are against the state's public policy, one wonders why the
district court and the attorney general did not want to promote that
policy by permitting the parties to dissolve their union rather than
requiring them to continue in a legal relationship that the state
apparently abhors.
3. West Virginia-Family Court
Granted Its Dissolution
M.G. and S.G. entered into a civil union on July 3, 2000, in
Bennington, Vermont. M.G. sought a dissolution based on
irreconcilable differences on July 29, 2002, in the Family Court of
Marion County, West Virginia.1 63 The parties had no children and
158 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998) ("A license may.not
be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex.").
159 No. F-185063 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Tex., Mar. 3, 2003)
(unpublished decision on file with author).
160 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 124 (enacting TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.204(b)), was
signed into law by the governor on May 27, 2003. Section 3 states that the new
law applies to a same-sex marriage or civil union whether it was entered into
before, on, or after the act's effective date.
161 Id. (enacting TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.204(a)(1)-(2)).
162 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (2001) states the following: "Only marriage
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."
163 In re M.G. and S.G., No. 02-D-292 (Fam. Ct. W.Va. Jan. 3, 2003)
(unpublished decision on file with author). Because this decision is unpublished
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had resolved all issues concerning division of property. Thus, the
only issue before the court was "whether or not petitioner and
respondent should be granted a divorce or a dissolution of the civil
union .... 164 The court referred to section' 1201(2) of the
Vermont statutes, which it interpreted as meaning that "two
eligible persons have established a relationship pursuant to this
chapter and may receive the benefits and protections and be subject
to the responsibilities of spouses."'1 65 The court also noted that,
under Vermont law, parties to a civil union must be members of
the same sex while parties to a marriage must be one woman and
one man.
166
Interestingly, the court determined that West Virginia's
statute, which purports to 167 refuse recognition of marriages
between persons of the same sex, did not apply to the case. West
Virginia Code section' 48-2-603 states the following:
A public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state,
territory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of the other state, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such a relationship, shall not be given
effect by this state. 1
68
Despite finding that a civil union gave the parties the "benefits
and protections" and "responsibilities of spouses," the court held
that "Vermont law does not define a Civil Union as a marriage,"
and thus, section 48-2-603 did not apply to this action. 169 The court
reached this conclusion despite language in the statute which
makes it applicable to "a relationship between persons of the same
and has not received the media attention of the Texas and Iowa lower court
decisions, for privacy reasons, I am using the women's initials only, even
though the court opinion includes their full names.
164 Id. VI.
165 Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2002)).
166 Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(4) (2002)).
167 None of the so-called "Defense of Marriage Acts" have been challenged
in court as unconstitutional. Until their constitutionality is upheld, I will refer to
them in this manner.
168 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2001).
169 In re MG. and S.G., No. 02-D-292, IX.
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sex that is treated as a marriage ... or a right or claim arising
from such a relationship. ,,170 Given the language of section' 48-
2-603, the court might have determined that a civil union fell
within that section, because Vermont law treats civil unions the
same as marriages. It could have then followed the lead of the
Connecticut and Texas courts and denied M.G. and S.G. the legal
assistance they were seeking in the legal dissolution of their
relationship.
Instead, the court was clear that it should not deny the parties
the relief they were seeking. It found that "[t]he parties are citizens
of West Virginia in need of a judicial remedy to dissolve a legal
relationship created by the laws of another state." 171 Because West
Virginia citizens needed the assistance of their state court, the
court declined to use section' 48-2-603 as a way to deny them that
assistance. Unlike the courts of Connecticut and Texas that refused
to provide assistance to their own citizens who were seeking legal
dissolution of their civil unions, this West Virginia family court
chose to provide the parties with a judgment ending their civil
union. The court ordered that the civil union be dissolved for
irreconcilable differences and that the parties have "no further legal
responsibility or relationship with each other." 
172
The actions of this family court judge were similar to those of
several other West Virginia courts. In State v. Austin,17 3 the West
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the underage marriage of a woman
in Maryland against a charge that the husband had contributed to
the delinquency of a minor. 74 The court specifically noted that
neither party to the marriage was seeking to annul the marriage,
that they were both happily married, and that the wife had not
instigated the charge against her husband. 175 Despite violating
West Virginia's evasion statute, the court upheld the Maryland
marriage, noting that marriages valid in another state will generally
be recognized as valid in West Virginia. 176 Although the marriage
170 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2001) (emphasis added).
171 In re MG. and S.G., No. 02-D-292, IX.
172 id. 1.
17' 234 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1977).
14 Id. at 664.
11 Id. at 662.
176 Id. at 662-63.
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was subject to annulment, it was valid and entitled to be fostered
and encouraged like all other marriages until, and unless, it was
annulled. 1
77
In Spradlin v. State Compensation Commissioner,178 the West
Virginia Supreme Court also recognized a marriage, celebrated in
Kentucky, that was claimed to be bigamous because the husband
supposedly had been previously married and not divorced. 179
Finding that the evidence failed to establish any prior marriage of
the husband, the court noted that the presumption that a "lawfully
solemnized or consummated" marriage exists is "one of the
strongest presumptions of the law, ... [regardless ofi whether the
marriage was a common-law marriage or a ceremonial one, ...,
whether regularly or irregularly, or however proven, whether
directly or by circumstantial evidence." IS0 Thus the wife was
entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits upon her
husband's death.' 81
The West Virginia Supreme Court also upheld the validity of a
common law marriage created in the District of Columbia, even
though West Virginia law did not recognize common law
marriage. 182 Applying D.C. law, the court found that the parties
had validly entered into a common law marriage during the six
years they lived in the district, despite living for twenty-four years
in Virginia, which also did not recognize common law
marriages. 1
83
These cases show that West Virginia courts have been willing
to honor the relationships that their citizens have entered and
provide the assistance those citizens needed from their courts.
Similarly, the West Virginia court dissolved the civil union of
177 Id.
178 113 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1960).
179 Id. at 834.
180 Id. at 835.
181 Id. at 835-36. It is important to note that the court considered, but did
not decide, whether it should apply Kentucky law, which would declare a
subsequent bigamous marriage to be void, or West Virginia case law, which
would find such a marriage only voidable until judicially declared a nullity. Id.
at 834-35 (citing Sledd v. State Comp. Comm'r, 163 S.E. 12, 13 (W. Va.1932)).
182 See generally In re Foster, 376 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1988).
183 Id. at 147.
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these two women because they were "in need of a judicial
remedy."
4. Iowa-District Court Granted
Dissolution
In another case that has drawn significant media attention,
184
the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Iowa, granted a
dissolution to KJB and JSP on November 14, 2003.185 According
to the petition for dissolution, the two women had "married" in
Bolton, Vermont, on March 25, 2002; the marital relationship
broke down "to such an extent that the legitimate objects of
matrimony ha[d] been destroyed and there remain[ed] no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage c[ould] be preserved;" and
they sought dissolution of their relationship with property and
debts to be equally divided between the two.
1 86
With little fanfare, District Court Judge Jeffrey A. Neary
granted the dissolution of marriage, finding that their "Stipulation
in Dissolution of Marriage" was duly signed by the parties and
proper, and made its provisions part of the Decree dissolving the
women's "marriage." Nowhere did the court indicate that it was
dissolving a Vermont civil union (as opposed to a Vermont
marriage), and nowhere did the court indicate any concern about
subject matter jurisdiction or contrary Iowa statutes. In fact, in
media stories after his decision, Judge Neary was quoted as saying
that he signed the divorce agreement "without realizing the couple
who wished to break up were both women." 187After noticing the
two women's names on the petition and discussing the matter with
the lawyer for one of the women, the judge decided to allow the
184 See, e.g., Kathleen Burge, Iowa Judge Causes Stir in Granting Gay
Divorce, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 2003, at B I.
85 In re KJB and JSP, No. CDCD 119660 (Woodbury County Dist. Ct,
Iowa Nov. 14, 2003) (unpublished opinion on file with author). I have used
initials to protect the parties' privacy.
186 Petition for Dissolution, at 1-2, filed with the court on August 1, 2003
(unpublished court papers on file with the author). The parties referred to
themselves as being "married" and to their "marital" relationship having been
irretrievably broken down, even though they did not legally marry but rather
entered into a Vermont civil union.
187 Burge, supra note 184, at BI.
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divorce to stand. He said, "We can't ignore it from a legal
perspective. ""We have to figure out how to deal with it. If people
have disputes, and they otherwise live here, then they should have
access to the judicial system."188
But others were not as understanding and tolerant as Judge
Neary. After Neary's decision was reported by the media, four
state representatives, two state senators, one congressman, one
private citizen, and one church challenged his ruling in the Iowa
Supreme Court. 189 The basis for their petition was that Iowa code
section 595.2(1) states that "[o]nly a marriage between a male and
a female is valid."'190 Thus Judge Neary lacked the legal authority
to acknowledge a Vermont civil union as a marriage and to
dissolve this civil union under chapter 598 of the Iowa code which
controls divorce. 191 They concluded that the judge "usurped
lawmaking 9owers designated to the legislature by redefining
marriage. '"
Among the grievances that flow from this act, the petition
stated that (1) as taxpayers, they have been injured by the court
opening up a new class of litigants outside those who are provided
for under state law requiring an expenditure of judicial resources;
(2) as married people, they are interested in promoting marriage as
a legal union that confers on the legally married certain rights and
privileges not granted others; and (3) as members of the
legislature, they were active in restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples only. 193 They asked the court to annul the district court's
188 id.
189 Alons v. Judge of the Iowa District Court, petition for cert. filed (Iowa
Dec. 15, 2003), cert. granted (Iowa Jan. 12, 2004).
190 Id. at 2 (citing IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2001)). But see generally Andrea
L. Clausen, Note, Marriage of Same-Sex Couples in Iowa: Iowa Code 595.2 Is
Not Constitutional Under the Iowa Constitution Article , §§ 1, 6, and 9, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 451 (2002).
191 Alons, at 2. The petitioners also allege that the two women were not
married as indicated in their petition for dissolution, because VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 8 (2002) defines marriage as "the legally recognized union of one man and
one woman," and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202(2) (2002) requires that the
parties of a civil union "[b]e of the same sex and therefore excluded from the
marriage laws of this state." Id.
192 Id.
'9' Id. at 3.
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ruling "in order to avoid injustice which will result unless such
relief is granted." 
194
In the amazingly public struggle over these women's private
relationship, Judge Neary then issued a revised opinion following
the petition for certiorari. In a two-page ruling, he said that "he had
no jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage defined by state law, but he
could terminate the civil union that joined the women." 195 He
determined that the parties' "civil union no longer existed," the
parties "are free of any obligations incident thereto," and that both
were "declared to be single individuals with all the rights of an
unmarried individual, including but not limited to, the right to
marry.' 196 When he originally granted a divorce to the women,
Judge Neary noted that "[w]e can't turn people away from our
court system and say we can't resolve your disputes .... I clearly
look at this as a dispute between parties that in some way I'm
going to have to solve."'
197
Unlike the petitioners seeking to intervene in the case, it is
clear that Judge Neary recognized the importance of helping Iowa
citizens who were seeking dissolution of a legal relationship that
no longer worked for the parties. While he did not cite Iowa
precedent, it seems that he was providing the same type of
assistance to this couple as the Iowa Supreme Court has applied
when honoring out-of-state marriages in the past.
In Boehm v. Rohlfs, 19 8 the court considered whether the
marriage of two Wisconsin residents (one age nineteen, one age
fourteen) in Minnesota was valid in Iowa. 199 The question before
the court was whether Harry Rohlfs, the husband, had attained his
194 Id. at 6.
195 Frank Santiago, Judge Revises His Ruling on Lesbians' Divorce, DES
MOINES REG., Dec. 31, 2003, at 3B.
196 Id. Unfortunately, Judge Neary seemed to ignore that the uproar created
by his earlier ruling was based, specifically, on the fact that these two women
are legally prevented from marrying in Iowa. Unlike other unmarried
individuals, those who wish to enter into a same-sex marriage are denied the
right to marry.
'9 Id. As Daniel Bray, chair of the Iowa State Bar Association's Family
Law section, stated, "[A]ll the two women 'wanted was a legal remedy.'. . . And
Judge Neary is clearly within what the law would allow." Id.
'9' 276 N.W. 105 (Iowa 1937).
'
9 9 Id. at 107.
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majority (then twenty-one) by marrying Ruth Dutter in Minnesota,
which would have entitled him to inherit from his decedent uncle.
The court noted that Wisconsin law, which is where the couple was
domiciled at the time of the marriage, prevented marriage by
females under the age of fifteen. Additionally, Wisconsin law also
prevented Wisconsin residents from leaving the state to contract a
marriage that would have been prohibited under Wisconsin law, by
also making those out-of-state marriages null and void in
Wisconsin. 200
Finding that the marriage was voidable, but not void, the court
concluded that it was valid under Minnesota law where it was
celebrated, and "a marriage valid where made is valid
everywhere. '" 20 1 Noting that had the husband not died and the
parties remained married for one year, the marriage would no
longer be voidable.20 2 The court focused on the policy reasons
behind permitting underage spouses to have their marriages
honored, noting that "it is not the policy of the law to impose upon
them and especially their innocent offspring, the distressing
penalties that would result if the marriage was held to be
absolutely void.... ,,203
5. Conclusion
What can be seen from reviewing these four cases is that the
courts of Connecticut and Texas refused to provide their citizens
with the help that they were seeking in legally ending their civil
200 Id. at 107-08. The court cited WIS. STAT. § 245.02 (renumbered as §
765.02 (2001)) (underage marriage) and WIS. STAT. § 245.04 (renumbered as §
765.04 (2001)), which states:
If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is
disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state
shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage prohibited
and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and
void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though such
prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state.
Id. Wisconsin was one of only a handful of states to adopt the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act. See If We Marry, supra note 18, at 1074.






unions. Unlike those courts, the courts of West Virginia and Iowa
(and initially the judge from Texas) understood that their role was
to help their own state's citizens dissolve a legal relationship that
was irretrievably broken. Rather than using technical arguments
based on limits of subject matter jurisdiction to refuse assistance to
same-sex couples who needed legal help, these judges
acknowledged that their citizens had entered into a valid legal
relationship in Vermont and needed to end that relationship in a
way that was valid and legal in their own domicile. By using the
broad subject matter jurisdiction of their courts and providing a
remedy to those who needed it, the West Virginia and Iowa courts
provide guidance to other courts that will be facing similar
decisions in the future.
Although none of the four courts expressly used an "incidents
of marriage" analysis when considering how to handle the
interstate recognition of a Vermont civil union, the judges from
West Virginia, Iowa, and (initially) Texas implicitly applied that
analysis. Rather than be distracted by considering whether the
parties' civil union needed to be honored for all purposes because
the parties before them were asking for legal dissolution alone, the
judges used their broad authority to resolve their citizens' legal
problems and provided the limited assistance requested. Had the
Texas Attorney General not intervened and focused on the civil
union's universal status ("a divorce cannot be granted where a
marriage never existed"20 4), the Texas judge would have joined the
West Virginia and Iowa judges in recognizing the Vermont civil
union for the only reason requested-a legal dissolution. Providing
that limited legal remedy to its citizens seeking assistance would
have promoted policies inherent in the lower courts' broad
jurisdictional powers while not addressing issues that the parties
were not raising, such as whether their Vermont civil union
requires universal recognition during ongoing cohabitation in the
state.
204 See Simoneaux, supra note 148.
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C. Decisions of Courts When the Same-Sex Couple
Was Seeking Recognition ofIts Civil Union
For an Incident of Marriage
1. Georgia-Appellate Court Refuses to
Recognize Civil Union
The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Burns v. Burns
20 5
was the first reported appellate decision concerning the interstate
recognition of a Vermont civil union. In that case, a dispute arose
between Darian and Susan Bums over the meaning of the consent
decree entered following their divorce to control custody of their
three children. After an earlier dispute arose, the parties agreed to a
court order modifying their custody rights and requiring that "there
shall be no visitation nor residence by the children with either
party during any time where such party cohabits with or has
overnight stays with any adult to which such party is not legally
married or to whom the party is not related within the second
degree."
206
In July 2000, Susan Burns and her female partner entered into
a civil union in Vermont. Darian then filed an action for contempt
alleging that Susan violated the consent decree by living with her
partner while the children were visiting. Susan opposed the
motion, arguing that she had complied with the consent decree's
requirements by virtue of her Vermont civil union.
The trial court held that the civil union was not a marriage and
that Susan was in contempt of its decree. On appeal, the Georgia
Court of Appeals also held that the civil union was not a marriage,
neither in Vermont nor Georgia, and thus she was violating the
consent decree. Under Vermont law, the legislature had explicitly
stated that marriage in Vermont was restricted to the "legally
recognized union of one man and one woman," 20 7 and civil unions
were reserved for same-sex couples who were "excluded from the
205 Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 2002
Ga. Lexis 626 (Ga. 2002); see generally Katie Eyer, Note, Related Within the
Second Degree? Burns v. Bums and the Potential Benefits of Civil Union Status,
20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297 (2002).
206 Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48.




marriage laws" of Vermont.208 The court also held that Georgia
would not recognize the Vermont civil union as a marriage, even if
Vermont had permitted same-sex couples to marry, because
Georgia Code section' 19-3-3.1(a) states that the public policy of
Georgia is "to recognize the union only of man and woman.
Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this
state.",209 It also considered Georgia Code section' 19-3-3.1(b),
which states:
No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be
recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a
marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction
or otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights
granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the
courts of this state and the courts of this state shall have no
jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a
divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage
or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties'
respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with
such marriage.
2 10
The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the Georgia
legislature had chosen not to recognize marriages between persons
of the same sex and it was bound by that decision.
211
Professor Andrew Koppelman has questioned the validity of
such a "blanket rule of nonrecognition," like those contained in
Georgia's and other states' antimarriage statutes by noting that
such a rule has never been seen before in conflict of law statutes.
212
Even with interracial marriages in the South, where both state
statutes and constitutions declared such marriages to be void and
208 Id. § 1202(2).
209 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(a) (1999).
210Id. § 19-3-3.1(b).
211 Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49.
212 See Koppelman, supra note 43, at 926. He notes that the Georgia statute
may not quite be a "blanket rule of nonrecognition" because it states that
"contractual rights" arising from same-sex marriages are unenforceable, without
indicating whether other rights, such as wrongful death or intestate inheritance
rights, are prohibited. See The Miscegenation Precedents, supra note 84, at 130.
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subjected their celebrants to criminal penalties, states did honor
out-of-state interracial marriages for some purposes. 213 "Yet even
in this charged context, the courts rejected the blanket rule of
nonrecognition. In every case that did not involve cohabitation
within the forum, and in some that did, Southern courts recognized
interracial marriages. '' 214 Whether in the U.S. or in other countries,
Koppelman concluded that a blanket rule of nonrecognition is an
"extraordinary" rule and found that "there appear to be few settled
bodies of law anywhere in the world that routinely refuse to give
any effect to any set of foreign marriages validly contracted
elsewhere by foreign domiciliaries. 215 Under such an analysis,
Georgia's statute may someday be held to be invalid given its
extreme breadth, especially when compared to its usual practice of
validating the marriages of opposite-sex couples.
The Georgia Court of Appeals also rejected Susan's argument
that her right to privacy was denied by not permitting her to
cohabit with her partner when her children were present. It stated
that Susan had agreed to be bound by the language in the consent
decree.216 Showing a complete indifference to the difficult decision
it was forcing on Susan either to live with her partner or share
custody of her children, the court stated that "if Susan wanted to
ensure that her civil union would be recognized in the same
manner as a marriage, she should have included language to that
effect in the consent decree itself.,2 17
Clearly, the court never considered whether Susan had already
come out as a lesbian at the time she entered into the consent
decree. If she had not, then it was foolish for the court to assume
she would request language during her divorce that would include
a possible same-sex relationship in the future when she had never
before considered entering such a relationship. Even if she had
already come out, the court never considered whether it was
213 Koppelman, supra note 43, at 929.
2 4 id.
215 Id. See Koppelman's "Appendix: Public Policy and Marriage in
Comparative Perspective," id. at 992-1001, for authorities from around the
world.
216 Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied,
2002 Ga. Lexis 626 (Ga. 2002).217 id.
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realistic to expect her to discuss living with her same-sex partner
while negotiating custody of her children before a family court
judge unlikely to be favorably inclined toward protecting both
relationships. Numerous cases have refused custody and visitation
to lesbians and gay men, 2 18 and it seems unrealistic to expect Susan
to put her custody or visitation at risk in order to insist on a right to
visitation while her same-sex partner was living in her home.
Finally, the court never considered whether Susan understood the
difference between civil marriages and civil unions drawn by the
court.
The court also did not consider the different purposes behind
the cohabitation restriction. At least one purpose could have been
to ensure that the parties' minor children were not subjected to
having numerous adults in their household while they were
growing up.2 19 It limited each parent to one long-term partner
living in the parent's house and ensured that there would be some
stability in a living situation already made difficult by the parents'
inability to coexist peacefully after their divorce.
Additionally, the Court made no effort to consider whether
recognizing Susan's civil union for such limited purposes would be
consistent with prior Georgia precedent from marriage recognition
cases. For example, in Montgomery v. Gable,220 the Georgia Court
of Appeals recognized a second marriage by a Georgia man
celebrated in Alabama, despite a divorce decree from his first
marriage that forbade him to remarry. Although the husband and
his second wife met in Georgia, he followed her to Alabama where
they married and lived briefly before returning to Georgia. The
court found that neither Georgia Code section' 53-214, which
218 See, e.g., Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of
Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R.5th 591 (1998);
Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Custodial Parent's Homosexual or Lesbian
Relationship with Third Person as Justifying Modification of Child Custody
Order, 65 A.L.R. 5th 591 (1999) (citing numerous cases in which custody or
visitation was denied or modified based on the parent's sexual orientation or
based on the parent's same-sex relationship).
2'9 The court never stated that the marriage restriction was added as a
means for Susan's ex-husband to limit her relationships to those whom she
could marry (at that time, only men) or that Susan was a lesbian at the time the
consent decree was entered.
220 7 S.E.2d 426, 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940).
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states that only those out-of-state marriages that could be
solemnized in state will be recognized in the state, and 'which
prevents parties from leaving the state to evade its marriage laws
by going to another state to marry, did not prevent recognition of
the marriage in question.22 1 It reached this conclusion despite easy
arguments to the contrary that the marriage could not have been
solemnized in Georgia and that the couple seemed to be evading
Georgia's marriage laws by marrying in Alabama. Finding that the
wife was a bona-fide resident of Alabama, the court upheld the
marriage for the purposes of permitting the wife to inherit, over the
objection of the daughter from the first marriage. 222
The court reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Wacht.223 There, the Court of
Appeals also recognized a marriage by a woman who was
prohibited from remarrying in Georgia after her divorce, who
moved with her parents to Alabama, and who married her second
husband there.224 They lived in other states for two and one-half
years, before moving to Georgia, thus clearly marrying and living
outside the state for purposes other than evading the Georgia
disability on the wife.22
5
Finally, in Smith v. Smith,226 the guardians of a young man's
estate tried to have his marriage declared void because he was
underage when he married his wife in Alabama, and then returned
immediately to live in Georgia. The court found that the marriage
was "not so much contrary to law as unauthorized by law," 227
despite reviewing numerous sources that declared such marriages
to be void and despite similar wording in the Georgia statute.228Instead, the court concluded that the couple had ratified the
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 66 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951).
224 Id. at 758-59.
225 Id.
226 11 S.E. 496 (Ga. 1890).227 Id. at 498.
228 Id. at 498-99. Interestingly for same-sex couples whose marriages the
Georgia legislature had also declared to be void, the court stated that "there is no
absolute incompatibility-no positive incongruity-between [a] void marriage and




marriage by living together after the age of consent, and therefore,
the wife was entitled to a new trial on whether she could inherit
from her husband.229
The court could have recognized Susan's civil union for the
limited purpose of permitting her to live with her partner and have
her children visit, without violating any Georgia statute. Not only
is a civil union not a marriage and thus, under the terms of the
Georgia statute, not actually prohibited, 230 but Susan had fulfilled
the primary intent of the restriction in the consent decree. She had
done as much as possible to enter into a legally sanctioned
relationship with her female partner, given Georgia's refusal to
permit same-sex couples to marry, and to ensure that visitation
with her children would not be lost by living with her partner.
Having taken every step she could have taken, other than living
alone or entering into a marriage with a man, the court should have
recognized her civil union as fulfilling the purpose of the
restriction in the consent decree. Its callous refusal to do so
prevents one of that state's families from enjoying the protection
and assistance it was entitled to receive from its own courts.
2. New York-Trial Court Recognizes
Civil Union
Contrary to the cases from Connecticut, Texas, and Georgia,
where the courts seemed to go out of their way to refuse to honor a
Vermont civil union, Justice Dunne of the New York Supreme
Court of Nassau County held that John Langan should be treated as
Neal Spicehandler's spouse based on the couple's Vermont civil
229 Id.
230 1 am not convinced that arguing for a limited reading of states'
antimarriage statutes, distinguishing between marriages and civil unions,
domestic partnerships, or reciprocal beneficiary relationships, makes sense.
Surely, its use will simply encourage states to pass or amend their statutes or
constitutions to include these other relationships, as was seen in the Texas
statute that refers to marriages or civil unions and the Nebraska constitution that
refers to the marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships of same-sex
couples. See supra notes 158-60. For an argument that antimarriage statutes
should be confined by their language to marriages alone and exclude these other
legal relationships, see Christopher D. Sawyer, Note, Practice What You
Preach: California 's Obligation to Give Full Faith and Credit to the Vermont
Civil Union, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 727 (2003).
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union, for purposes of Langan's wrongful death lawsuit against St.
Vincent's Hospital. 231 The court stated that the couple had lived
together since 1986 and were joined in a civil union, attended by
friends and family, in 2000.232
The court noted that "New York adheres to the general rule
that 'marriage contracts, valid where made, are valid everywhere,
unless contrary to natural laws or statutes.'''..233 Based on that rule,
the court held that "if [the] plaintiff has a validly contracted
marriage in the State of Vermont, and if the Vermont civil union
does not offend public policy as would an incestuous or
polygamous union, it will be recognized in the State of New York
for purposes of the wrongful death statute." 234 Explicitly following
the incident of marriage analysis urged in this article, Justice
Dunne explained that:
the court will not determine whether plaintiff has a valid
marriage in the State of New York for all purposes, but only
whether he may be considered a spouse for purposes of the
wrongful death statute, much as the Court of Appeals has held
that a same sex domestic partner is a 'family' member for the
limited purposes of the New York City's rent control laws.23
5
The court reviewed the numerous ways in which same-sex
couples are given legal recognition and protection under New York
law, including recognition by New York City and by the state for
employment benefits, recognition as "family" members under rent
control laws, permission to adopt one another's children using
second parent adoptions, and recognition for benefits following the
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City.236 The court noted
that "while other jurisdictions were enacting [antimarriage laws],
New York State amended [its laws] to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation .... ,,237 The court concluded that
231 Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003).
212 Id. at 412.
233 Id. at 414 (quoting Shea v. Shea, 63 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1945)).
234 Id. (citing Shea, 63 N.E.2d at 113).
235 Id. at 415.
236 Id. at 415-16.
237 Id. at 416.
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"New York's public policy does not preclude recognition of a
same-sex union entered into in a sister state. . .. "238
New York precedent would also have led the court to honor a
marriage that was valid in the state where contracted. For example,
in Van Voorhis v. Brintnall,239 the New York Court of Appeals
considered whether a child from the second marriage of her father
could inherit as his legitimate heir when he had been divorced in
New York from his first wife on grounds of adultery and
prohibited from remarrying within his first wife's lifetime.
240
Finding that the legislature could have prevented New York
citizens from remarrying outside New York, the court concluded
instead that "[t]he statute does not in terms prohibit a second
marriage in another State, and it should not be extended by
construction." 241 Thus, even though New York statutes declared
marriages after divorce for adultery to be "absolutely void" if
entered into before the death of the first spouse, the court found
there was no "intent so to impress the citizen with the prohibition
as to make an act, which is innocent and valid when performed, an
offense when he returns to this State[,] and himself a criminal for
performing it." 242 Thus, the court concluded the child was
legitimate and entitled to inherit from her father.243
Following this precedent, in Holland v. Holland,244 the court
considered whether a marriage in Oregon by New York residents
who were under the statutory age to marry in New York could be
annulled in New York. The court stated the general rule as being
one that honors marriages if valid where celebrated, "unless
contrary to the prohibition of natural law or the express prohibition
238 Id. This could well be true, because the state's public policy, even if
opposed to marriages by same-sex couples, may not be violated by a claim by
the surviving spouse after the death of his or her spouse. Henson, supra note 73,
at 581. Henson also emphasized that this incident of marriage is not provided by
the state (except by recognizing that the surviving spouse has standing to bring
the suit), but instead is provided by a private enterprise in terms of damages
awarded for the wrongful death. Id. at 581-82.239 86 N.Y. 18 (1881).
240 Id. at 18.
241 Id. at 32.
242 Id. at 35.
243 Id. at 38.
244 212 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
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of a statute of the state of which the parties were citizens at the
time of their marriage and in which the marriage is questioned.
2 45
Additionally, the New York Court of Appeals in the case of In
re May's Estate,2 46 stated that "in the absence of a statute expressly
regulating within the domiciliary State marriages solemnized
abroad,, 247 and except for polygamous or incestuous marriages, a
marriage valid where celebrated will be honored in New York.
Even after stating the exception for incestuous marriages, the court
recognized a marriage in Rhode Island between an uncle and a
niece, both of whom were New York residents. 248 Although the
New York statutes declared incestuous marriages to be void and
imposed criminal penalties on violators, the court held that "the
statute does not by express terms regulate a marriage solemnized in
another State whereAs [sic] in our present case, the marriage was
concededly legal.,
249
Since no New York statute prevented it from recognizing the
civil union before it, the Langan court next considered the
purposes behind Vermont's civil unions statute and determined that
"the civil union is indistinguishable from marriage,
notwithstanding that the Vermont legislature withheld the title of
marriage from application to the union." 250 Thus, John Langan
should be recognized as Neal Spicehandler's spouse and would be
entitled to recover in a wrongful death action in Vermont. 2 5 1 The
only remaining question facing the court was whether to recognize
Langan as Spicehandler's spouse in New York, and the court used
the same analysis that it would use in deciding whether to
recognize a spouse in a sister state's common law marriage.
252
The court turned to the legislative purpose of New York's
wrongful death statute and found that the statute was intended to
"compensate the pecuniary losses first and foremost of the
245 Id. at 806.
246 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
247 Id. at 6.
248 Id. at 5.
249 Id. at 6.
250 Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417-18 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2003).




decedent's immediate family, that is, his or her spouse and
children, those most likely to have expected support and to have
suffered pecuniary injury." 253 Finding Langan as "[t]he person
most likely to have expected support and to have suffered
pecuniary injury[,]" the court held that he was a spouse for
purposes of the New York statute.254 Even though the legislature,
when writing New York's wrongful death statute, would not have
intended to include the same-sex spouses from civil unions within
that definition, the court noted that concepts of marriage evolve
over time.255 Finding that spouse is a gender neutral term, the court
looked at the intended meaning of that term in determining that
Langan should be viewed as a spouse within the meaning of the
wrongful death statute. Even more importantly, the court
recognized that excluding Langan from the remedy offered by the
wrongful death statute would be based on little more than
unconstitutional discrimination:
Spouse is a gender neutral word, it applies to a man or a
woman, and is applied to plaintiff under the Vermont civil
union. As the [wrongful death statute] is construed to apply to a
common law couple who have not been joined by a civil
ceremony and may separate at will, it is impossible to justify,
under equal protection principles, withholding the same
recognition from a union which meets all the requirements of a
marriage in New York but for the sexual orientation of its
partners.
... To withhold recognition from one joined under the
Vermont statute on the grounds that it is not a marriage, when
it requires all the same formalities as New York, and at the
same time to extend recognition to a common law 'marriage'
... Id. at 419.
254 Id. The court went on to note that among those spouses who were
disqualified from being recognized as a surviving spouse included those whose
"marriage was void as incestuous... bigamous... or a prohibited remarriage,"
not a marriage by a same-sex couple. Id. (citing N.Y. DOMESTIC REL. LAW § 5-
1.2(2) (McKinney 1999)) (omissions in original).
211 Id. at 420.
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These two courts reached opposite results, one recognizing a
Vermont civil union and one refusing to do so. The New York
judge's opinion looked beyond negative prior precedent 257 and
concluded that there was no reason to refuse recognition to the
plaintiffs civil union from Vermont. The Georgia court's decision,
on the other hand, focused significantly on the literal words of the
parties' consent decree, finding that a civil union was not a
marriage within the terms of that agreement and finding Ms. Bums
in contempt for living with her same-sex partner and her children
at the same time. 258 Unfortunately, it may be possible that other
courts will follow the limited view raised by the Burns court to
avoid honoring the legal relationship entered into by the same-sex
couple before the court.
But when considering these cases, courts should remember
that countless cases exist recognizing out-of-state marriages by
opposite-sex couples despite defects or problems that would have
permitted the courts to refuse to honor those marriages. They
should consider whether an "incidents of marriage" approach to the
issue in the case may lead them to recognize the civil union,
domestic partnership, or marriage based on the policy reasons
behind that disputed issue. They should work as hard to honor the
relationships of same-sex couples as they have worked to honor the
relationships of opposite-sex couples.
256 Id. at 420-22.
257 See Raum v. Rest. Ass'n, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(holding that exclusion of same-sex unmarried partners from inclusion within
those who can sue under the wrongful death statute operates without regard to
sexual orientation), appeal dismissed, 681 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1998). The Langan
court held that Vermont's civil union statute provided a basis for distinguishing
Raum. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
258 Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
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